EXPLORE DETECTIONS
Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added
The following analytic detects the addition of a new owner to a Service Principal within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure Active Directory events from the AuditLog log category to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because Service Principals do not support multi-factor authentication or conditional access policies, making them a target for adversaries seeking persistence or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain access to the Azure AD environment with single-factor authentication, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over critical resources.
Azure AD Service Principal Privilege Escalation
This detection identifies when an Azure Service Principal elevates privileges by adding themself to a new app role assignment.
Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips
The following analytic detects an Azure AD account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 30-minute window. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify instances where the same user logs in from different IPs in a short time frame. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials being used by an adversary, potentially following a phishing attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.
Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication
The following analytic identifies a successful authentication event against an Azure AD tenant using PowerShell cmdlets. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify successful logins where the appDisplayName is "Microsoft Azure PowerShell." This activity is significant because it is uncommon for regular, non-administrative users to authenticate using PowerShell, and it may indicate enumeration and discovery techniques by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to perform extensive reconnaissance, potentially leading to privilege escalation or further exploitation within the Azure environment.
Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication
The following analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure SignInLogs data, specifically focusing on events where single-factor authentication succeeded. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, or further exploitation within the environment.
Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted
The following analytic identifies instances where admin consent is granted to an application within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically events related to the admin consent action within the ApplicationManagement category. This activity is significant because admin consent allows applications to access data across the entire tenant, potentially exposing vast amounts of organizational data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive and persistent access to sensitive data, leading to data exfiltration, espionage, further malicious activities, and potential compliance violations.
Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip
The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack against an Azure Active Directory tenant. It uses Azure SignInLogs data and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information.
Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application
The following analytic detects instances where Azure AD has blocked a user's attempt to grant consent to a risky or potentially malicious application. This detection leverages Azure AD audit logs, focusing on user consent actions and system-driven blocks. Monitoring these blocked consent attempts is crucial as it highlights potential threats early on, indicating that a user might be targeted or that malicious applications are attempting to infiltrate the organization. If confirmed malicious, this activity suggests that Azure's security measures successfully prevented a harmful application from accessing organizational data, warranting immediate investigation to understand the context and take preventive measures.
Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application
The following analytic identifies instances where a user has denied consent to an OAuth application seeking permissions within the Azure AD environment. This detection leverages Azure AD's audit logs, specifically focusing on user consent actions with error code 65004. Monitoring denied consent actions is significant as it can indicate users recognizing potentially suspicious or untrusted applications. If confirmed malicious, this activity could suggest attempts by unauthorized applications to gain access, potentially leading to data breaches or unauthorized actions within the environment. Understanding these denials helps refine security policies and enhance user awareness.
Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset
The following analytic detects an Azure AD user enabling a previously disabled account and resetting its password within 2 minutes. It uses Azure Active Directory events to identify this sequence of actions. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary with administrative access attempting to establish a backdoor identity within the Azure AD tenant. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to maintain persistent access, escalate privileges, and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information from the environment.
Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated
The following analytic identifies the modification of the SourceAnchor (ImmutableId) attribute for an Azure Active Directory user. This detection leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the "Update user" operation and changes to the SourceAnchor attribute. This activity is significant as it is a step in setting up an Azure AD identity federation backdoor, allowing an adversary to establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could impersonate any user, bypassing password and MFA requirements, leading to unauthorized access and potential data breaches.
Azure Automation Account Created
The following analytic detects the creation of a new Azure Automation account within an Azure tenant. It leverages Azure Audit events, specifically the Azure Activity log category, to identify when an account is created or updated. This activity is significant because Azure Automation accounts can be used to automate tasks and orchestrate actions across Azure and on-premise environments. If an attacker creates an Automation account with elevated privileges, they could maintain persistence, execute malicious runbooks, and potentially escalate privileges or execute code on virtual machines, posing a significant security risk.
Azure Automation Runbook Created
The following analytic detects the creation of a new Azure Automation Runbook within an Azure tenant. It leverages Azure Audit events, specifically the Azure Activity log category, to identify when a new Runbook is created or updated. This activity is significant because adversaries with privileged access can use Runbooks to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized actions such as creating Global Administrators, executing code on VMs, and compromising the entire Azure environment.
Azure Runbook Webhook Created
The following analytic detects the creation of a new Automation Runbook Webhook within an Azure tenant. It leverages Azure Audit events, specifically the "Create or Update an Azure Automation webhook" operation, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because Webhooks can trigger Automation Runbooks via unauthenticated URLs exposed to the Internet, posing a security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this to execute code, create users, or maintain persistence within the environment, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over Azure resources.
Batch File Write to System32
The following analytic detects the creation of a batch file (.bat) within the Windows system directory tree, specifically in the System32 or SysWOW64 folders. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on process and filesystem events to identify this behavior. This activity is significant because writing batch files to system directories can be indicative of malicious intent, such as persistence mechanisms or system manipulation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges, potentially compromising the entire system.
Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot
The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious `bcdedit` command that reconfigures a host from safe mode back to normal boot. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on command-line executions involving `bcdedit.exe` with specific parameters. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of ransomware, such as BlackMatter, which manipulates boot configurations to facilitate encryption processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control over the boot process, potentially leading to further system compromise and data encryption.
BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows error recovery boot configurations using bcdedit.exe with flags such as "recoveryenabled" and "no". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because ransomware often disables recovery options to prevent system restoration, making it crucial for SOC analysts to investigate. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder recovery efforts, allowing ransomware to cause extensive damage and complicate remediation.
BITS Job Persistence
The following analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` to schedule a BITS job for persistence on an endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line parameters such as `create`, `addfile`, and `resume`. This activity is significant because BITS jobs can be used by attackers to maintain persistence, download malicious payloads, or exfiltrate data. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to persist in the environment, execute arbitrary code, or transfer sensitive information, necessitating further investigation and potential remediation.
BITSAdmin Download File
The following analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` with the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because `bitsadmin.exe` can be exploited to download and execute malicious files without immediate detection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to download and execute payloads, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment. Review parallel and child processes, especially `svchost.exe`, for associated artifacts.
Certutil exe certificate extraction
The following analytic identifies the use of certutil.exe with arguments indicating the manipulation or extraction of certificates. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because extracting certificates can allow attackers to sign new authentication tokens, particularly in federated environments like Windows ADFS. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to forge authentication tokens, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.
CertUtil With Decode Argument
The following analytic detects the use of CertUtil.exe with the 'decode' argument, which may indicate an attempt to decode a previously encoded file, potentially containing malicious payloads. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving CertUtil.exe. This activity is significant because attackers often use CertUtil to decode malicious files downloaded from the internet, which are then executed to compromise the system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, further system compromise, and potential data exfiltration.
Change To Safe Mode With Network Config
The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious `bcdedit` command that configures a host to boot in safe mode with network support. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving `bcdedit.exe` with specific parameters. This activity is significant because it is a known technique used by BlackMatter ransomware to force a compromised host into safe mode for continued encryption. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass certain security controls, persist in the environment, and continue their malicious activities.
CHCP Command Execution
The following analytic detects the execution of the chcp.com utility, which is used to change the active code page of the console. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events. This activity is significant because it can indicate the presence of malware, such as IcedID, which uses this technique to determine the locale region, language, or country of the compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further system compromise and data exfiltration.
Check Elevated CMD using whoami
The following analytic identifies the execution of the "whoami" command with the "/group" flag, where the results are passed to the "find" command in order to look for a the string "12288". This string represents the SID of the group "Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level" effectively checking if the current process is running as a "High" integrity process or with Administrator privileges. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by attackers, such as FIN7, to perform reconnaissance on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attacker is assessing their privilege level, potentially leading to further privilege escalation or persistence within the environment.