EXPLORE
← Back to Explore
splunk_escuTTP

Azure AD Service Principal Privilege Escalation

This detection identifies when an Azure Service Principal elevates privileges by adding themself to a new app role assignment.

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection Query

`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="Add app role assignment to service principal" properties.initiatedBy.app.displayName=* properties.result=Success | spath path=properties{}.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{} output=targetResources | rename properties.* as * | eval user="NA" | eval src="NA" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eval(mvfilter(match(targetResources, "AppRole.Value")))) as appRole, values(eval(mvfilter(match(targetResources, "ServicePrincipal.DisplayName")))) as targetServicePrincipal values(eval(mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.displayName',0))) as targetAppContext values(user_agent) as user_agent values(identity) as servicePrincipal values(properties.initiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId) as servicePrincipalId by dest user src vendor_account vendor_product signature | spath input=appRole path=newValue output=appRole | spath input=targetServicePrincipal path=newValue output=targetServicePrincipal | eval appRole=trim(replace(appRole, "\"", "")), targetServicePrincipal=trim(replace(targetServicePrincipal, "\"", "")) | where servicePrincipal=targetServicePrincipal | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_service_principal_privilege_escalation_filter`

Author

Dean Luxton

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Azure Active Directory Add app role assignment to service principal

Tags

Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
Raw Content
name: Azure AD Service Principal Privilege Escalation
id: 29eb39d3-2bc8-49cc-99b3-35593191a588
version: 8
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Dean Luxton
data_source:
    - Azure Active Directory Add app role assignment to service principal
type: TTP
status: production
description: This detection identifies when an Azure Service Principal elevates privileges by adding themself to a new app role assignment.
search: >-
    `azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="Add app role assignment to service principal" properties.initiatedBy.app.displayName=* properties.result=Success
    | spath path=properties{}.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{} output=targetResources
    | rename properties.* as *
    | eval user="NA"
    | eval src="NA"
    | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eval(mvfilter(match(targetResources, "AppRole.Value")))) as appRole, values(eval(mvfilter(match(targetResources, "ServicePrincipal.DisplayName")))) as targetServicePrincipal values(eval(mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.displayName',0))) as targetAppContext
    values(user_agent) as user_agent values(identity) as servicePrincipal values(properties.initiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId) as servicePrincipalId by dest user src vendor_account vendor_product signature
    | spath input=appRole path=newValue output=appRole
    | spath input=targetServicePrincipal path=newValue output=targetServicePrincipal
    | eval appRole=trim(replace(appRole, "\"", "")), targetServicePrincipal=trim(replace(targetServicePrincipal, "\"", ""))
    | where servicePrincipal=targetServicePrincipal
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `azure_ad_service_principal_privilege_escalation_filter`
how_to_implement: The Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services add-on is required to ingest EntraID audit logs via Azure EventHub. See reference for links for further details on how to onboard this log source.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110
    - https://splunk.github.io/splunk-add-on-for-microsoft-cloud-services/Install/
    - https://github.com/mvelazc0/BadZure
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-m365-invaders-navigating-the-shadows-of-midnight-blizzard.html
    - https://posts.specterops.io/microsoft-breach-what-happened-what-should-azure-admins-do-da2b7e674ebc
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$servicePrincipal$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  servicePrincipal = "$servicePrincipal$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$servicePrincipal$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$servicePrincipal$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: Service Principal $servicePrincipal$ has elevated privileges by adding themself to app role $appRole$
    risk_objects:
        - field: servicePrincipal
          type: user
          score: 50
    threat_objects:
        - field: user_agent
          type: http_user_agent
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
    asset_type: Azure Tenant
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1098.003
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: identity
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.003/azure_ad_spn_privesc/azure_ad_spn_privesc.log
          sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad
          source: Azure AD