EXPLORE DETECTIONS
AWS IAM CompromisedKeyQuarantine Policy Attached to User
This rule looks for use of the IAM `AttachUserPolicy` API operation to attach the `CompromisedKeyQuarantine` or `CompromisedKeyQuarantineV2` AWS managed policies to an existing IAM user. This policy denies access to certain actions and is applied by the AWS team in the event that an IAM user's credentials have been compromised or exposed publicly.
AWS IAM Create User via Assumed Role on EC2 Instance
Detects the creation of an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user initiated by an assumed role on an EC2 instance. Assumed roles allow users or services to temporarily adopt different AWS permissions, but the creation of IAM users through these roles, particularly from within EC2 instances, may indicate a compromised instance. Adversaries might exploit such permissions to establish persistence by creating new IAM users under unauthorized conditions.
AWS IAM Customer-Managed Policy Attached to Role by Rare User
Detects when an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) customer-managed policy is attached to a role by an unusual or unauthorized user. Customer-managed policies are policies created and controlled within an AWS account, granting specific permissions to roles or users when attached. This rule identifies potential privilege escalation by flagging cases where a customer-managed policy is attached to a role by an unexpected actor, which could signal unauthorized access or misuse. Attackers may attach policies to roles to expand permissions and elevate their privileges within the AWS environment. This is a New Terms rule that uses the "cloud.account.id", "user.name" and "entity.target.id" fields to check if the combination of the actor identity and target role name has not been seen before.
AWS IAM Deactivation of MFA Device
Detects the deactivation of a Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) device in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). MFA provides critical protection against unauthorized access by requiring a second factor for authentication. Adversaries or compromised administrators may deactivate MFA devices to weaken account protections, disable strong authentication, or prepare for privilege escalation or persistence. This rule monitors successful DeactivateMFADevice API calls, which represent the point at which MFA protection is actually removed.
AWS IAM Group Creation
Identifies the creation of a group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). Groups specify permissions for multiple users. Any user in a group automatically has the permissions that are assigned to the group. Adversaries who obtain credentials with IAM write privileges may create a new group as a foothold for persistence: they can later attach admin-level policies to the group and quietly add users or roles to inherit those privileges.
AWS IAM Group Deletion
Detects when an IAM group is deleted using the DeleteGroup API call. Deletion of an IAM group may represent a malicious attempt to remove audit trails, disrupt operations, or hide adversary activity (for example after using the group briefly for privileged access). This can be an indicator of impact or cleanup in an attack lifecycle.
AWS IAM Login Profile Added for Root
Identifies creation of a console login profile for the AWS account root user. While CreateLoginProfile normally applies to IAM users, when performed from a temporary root session (e.g., via AssumeRoot) and the userName parameter is omitted, the profile is created for the root principal (self-assigned). Adversaries with temporary root access may add or reset the root login profile to establish persistent console access even if original access keys are rotated or disabled. Correlate with recent AssumeRoot/STS activity and validate intent with the account owner.
AWS IAM Long-Term Access Key Correlated with Elevated Detection Alerts
Correlates open detection alerts that share the same long-term IAM access key ID ( prefix AKIA). It fires when the rule AWS Long-Term Access Key First Seen from Source IP (rule_id: 9f8e3c5e-f72e-4e91-93f6-e98a4fae3e4f) has triggered for that key and at least one other open alert for the same key is medium, high, or critical severity. This higher-order rule helps prioritize long-term key novelty when it co-occurs with elevated detections that may indicate post-compromise activity.
AWS IAM Long-Term Access Key First Seen from Source IP
Identifies the first time, within the configured history window, that a long-term IAM access key ID (prefix AKIA) is used successfully from a given source.ip in AWS CloudTrail. Long-term access keys belong to IAM users or the account root user. They are a common target after credential theft or leakage, including supply-chain and exposed-key scenarios. Temporary security credentials (prefix ASIA) and console sessions are excluded so the signal emphasizes programmatic access patterns.
AWS IAM OIDC Provider Created by Rare User
Detects when an uncommon user or role creates an OpenID Connect (OIDC) Identity Provider in AWS IAM. OIDC providers enable web identity federation, allowing users authenticated by external identity providers (such as Google, GitHub, or custom OIDC-compliant providers) to assume IAM roles and access AWS resources. Adversaries who have gained administrative access may create rogue OIDC providers to establish persistent, federated access that survives credential rotation. This technique allows attackers to assume roles using tokens from an IdP they control. While OIDC provider creation is benign in some environments, it should still be validated against authorized infrastructure changes.
AWS IAM Principal Enumeration via UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
Detects repeated failed attempts to update an IAM role’s trust policy in an AWS account, consistent with role and user enumeration techniques. In this technique, an attacker who controls credentials in the current account repeatedly calls UpdateAssumeRolePolicy on a single role, cycling through guessed cross-account role or user ARNs as the principal. When those principals are invalid, IAM returns MalformedPolicyDocumentException, producing a burst of failed UpdateAssumeRolePolicy events. This rule alerts on that brute-force pattern originating from this account, which may indicate that the account is being used as attack infrastructure or that offensive tooling (such as Pacu) is running here. Note: this rule does not detect other accounts enumerating roles, because those API calls are logged in the caller’s account, not the target account.
AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Profile Creation
Detects the creation of a new AWS IAM Roles Anywhere profile. Roles Anywhere allows workloads or external systems to assume IAM roles from outside AWS by authenticating via trusted certificate authorities (trust anchors). Adversaries who have established persistence through a rogue trust anchor may create or modify profiles to link them with highly privileged roles, enabling long-term external access to the AWS environment. This rule identifies successful "CreateProfile" API calls and helps detect potentially unauthorized or risky external access configurations.
AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor Created with External CA
Detects the creation of an AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor that uses an external certificate authority (CA) rather than an AWS-managed Certificate Manager Private CA (ACM PCA). While Roles Anywhere enables secure, short-term credential issuance for workloads outside AWS, adversaries can exploit this feature by registering their own external CA as a trusted root. This allows them to generate valid client certificates that persistently authenticate to AWS roles from any location, even after key rotation or credential revocation events. This rule helps detect persistence or unauthorized federation attempts by flagging trust anchors configured with non-AWS CAs.
AWS IAM SAML Provider Created
Detects the creation of a new SAML Identity Provider (IdP) in AWS IAM. SAML providers enable federated authentication between AWS and external identity providers, allowing users to access AWS resources using credentials from the external IdP. Adversaries who have gained administrative access may create rogue SAML providers to establish persistent, federated access to AWS accounts that survives credential rotation. This technique allows attackers to assume roles and access resources by forging SAML assertions from an IdP they control. Creating a SAML provider is a rare administrative action that should be closely monitored and validated against authorized infrastructure changes.
AWS IAM SAML Provider Updated
Detects when an AWS IAM SAML provider is updated, which manages federated authentication between AWS and external identity providers (IdPs). Adversaries with administrative access may modify a SAML provider’s metadata or certificate to redirect authentication flows, enable unauthorized federation, or escalate privileges through identity trust manipulation. Because SAML providers underpin single sign-on (SSO) access for users and applications, unauthorized modifications may allow persistent or covert access even after credentials are revoked. Monitoring "UpdateSAMLProvider" API activity is critical to detect potential compromise of federated trust relationships.
AWS IAM User Addition to Group
Identifies the addition of a user to a specified group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). Any user added to a group automatically gains the permissions that are assigned to the group. If the target group carries elevated or admin privileges, this action can instantly grant high-risk permissions useful for credential misuse, lateral movement, or privilege escalation.
AWS IAM User Created Access Keys For Another User
An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by creating a new set of credentials for an existing user. This rule looks for use of the IAM `CreateAccessKey` API operation to create new programmatic access keys for another IAM user.
AWS IAM Virtual MFA Device Registration Attempt with Session Token
Detects attempts to create or enable a Virtual MFA device (CreateVirtualMFADevice, EnableMFADevice) using temporary AWS credentials (access keys beginning with ASIA). Session credentials are short-lived and tied to existing authenticated sessions, so using them to register or enable MFA devices is unusual. Adversaries who compromise temporary credentials may abuse this behavior to establish persistence by attaching new MFA devices to maintain access to high-privilege accounts despite key rotation or password resets.
AWS KMS Customer Managed Key Disabled or Scheduled for Deletion
Identifies attempts to disable or schedule the deletion of an AWS customer managed KMS Key. Disabling or scheduling a KMS key for deletion removes the ability to decrypt data encrypted under that key and can permanently destroy access to critical resources. Adversaries may use these operations to cause irreversible data loss, disrupt business operations, impede incident response, or hide evidence of prior activity. Because KMS keys often protect sensitive or regulated data, any modification to their lifecycle should be considered highly sensitive and investigated promptly.
AWS Lambda Function Policy Updated to Allow Public Invocation
Identifies when an AWS Lambda function policy is updated to allow public invocation. This rule detects use of the AddPermission API where the Principal is set to "*", enabling any AWS account to invoke the function. Adversaries may abuse this configuration to establish persistence, create a covert execution path, or operate a function as an unauthenticated backdoor. Public invocation is rarely required outside very specific workloads and should be considered high-risk when performed unexpectedly.
AWS Lambda Layer Added to Existing Function
Identifies when a Lambda layer is added to an existing AWS Lambda function. Lambda layers allow shared code, dependencies, or runtime modifications to be injected into a function’s execution environment. Adversaries with the ability to update function configurations may add a malicious layer to establish persistence, run unauthorized code, or intercept data handled by the function. This activity should be reviewed to ensure the modification is expected and authorized.
AWS Management Console Brute Force of Root User Identity
Identifies a high number of failed authentication attempts to the AWS management console for the Root user identity. An adversary may attempt to brute force the password for the Root user identity, as it has complete access to all services and resources for the AWS account.
AWS Management Console Root Login
Identifies a successful login to the AWS Management Console by the Root user.
AWS RDS DB Instance Made Public
Identifies the creation or modification of an Amazon RDS DB instance or cluster where the "publiclyAccessible" attribute is set to "true". Publicly accessible RDS instances expose a network endpoint on the public internet, which may allow unauthorized access if combined with overly permissive security groups, weak authentication, or misconfigured IAM policies. Adversaries may enable public access on an existing instance, or create a new publicly accessible instance, to establish persistence, move data outside of controlled network boundaries, or bypass internal access controls.