EXPLORE DETECTIONS
AWS Bedrock Knowledge Base or RAG Data Source Tampering
Detects control-plane mutations to AWS Bedrock knowledge bases and their backing RAG data sources via CloudTrail. An adversary with access to Bedrock Agent APIs can poison the corpus that RAG-enabled models treat as authoritative by ingesting attacker-controlled documents (IngestKnowledgeBaseDocuments, StartIngestionJob), deleting legitimate documents (DeleteKnowledgeBaseDocuments), or repointing/altering the data source itself (CreateDataSource, UpdateDataSource, DeleteDataSource, UpdateKnowledgeBase). Because downstream applications and users trust model answers grounded in this stored data, tampering with the corpus is a stored data manipulation that can drive misinformation, fraud, or manipulated decisions at inference time. This is a New Terms rule that looks for the first time a given identity ARN performs one of these knowledge base or data source mutations within the history window.
AWS Bedrock Model Invocation Logging Disabled or Modified
Detects when an AWS Bedrock model invocation logging configuration is deleted or overwritten via the DeleteModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration or PutModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration API calls. Model invocation logging is the source that feeds the logs-aws_bedrock.invocation-* dataset relied upon by all data-plane Bedrock detections. An adversary who has gained access to a Bedrock environment can blind defenders by deleting this configuration, or by using the Put API to redirect logs to an attacker-controlled or non-monitored S3 bucket or CloudWatch log group. Because this single control-plane action can neutralize the entire data-plane detection stack, it is a high-value evasion technique that should be validated against expected administrative change activity.
AWS Bedrock Model Prompt or Completion Containing Credentials
Identifies an Amazon Bedrock model invocation whose prompt or completion contains an AWS access key identifier (AKIA long-term or ASIA temporary/STS, followed by 16 characters), an Amazon Bedrock API key (ABSK bearer token), or a PEM private-key block. Credentials in the model input mean an application or user is sending secrets to the model, exposing them to invocation logging, the model provider, and prompt history; credentials in the model output mean the model is emitting secrets, which can result from training-data leakage, poisoned context, or a prompt-injection-driven exfiltration attempt. Either case is a credential-exposure event that warrants immediate rotation of the affected secret.
AWS Bedrock Provisioned Model Throughput Tampering
Detects creation, modification, or deletion of AWS Bedrock Provisioned Model Throughput via the CreateProvisionedModelThroughput, UpdateProvisionedModelThroughput, and DeleteProvisionedModelThroughput APIs. Provisioned Throughput reserves dedicated, billed model capacity for Amazon Bedrock. An adversary who scales this capacity up can drive large, unauthorized cost (cloud resource/bill hijacking), while deleting reserved throughput can cause denial of service to production workloads that depend on that committed capacity. These control-plane changes should be validated against approved capacity-planning and change-management processes.
AWS Bedrock Resource-Based Policy Modified or Deleted
Detects modification or deletion of resource-based access policies on AWS Bedrock resources via the PutResourcePolicy and DeleteResourcePolicy API calls. Resource-based policies govern which principals (including external accounts) may access Bedrock resources such as agents, knowledge bases, and custom models. An adversary may attach a resource policy granting an external or unexpected principal access to a Bedrock resource to establish persistence or enable cross-account access, or may delete an existing policy to weaken access controls. These changes should be validated for principal ownership and least-privilege intent.
AWS Bedrock Third-Party or External Knowledge Base Associated to Agent
Detects when an Amazon Bedrock agent is associated with, or updated to use, a knowledge base via the AssociateAgentKnowledgeBase, or UpdateAgentKnowledgeBase API actions. Bedrock agents consume knowledge base (RAG) content as trusted context for the model. By wiring an agent to an externally controlled or third-party knowledge base, or by swapping in an attacker-controlled knowledge base, an adversary can redraw the agent's trust boundary toward an untrusted source. This is a software-supply-chain compromise and an indirect prompt-injection delivery vector: poisoned or adversarial content served from the associated knowledge base is treated as authoritative by the agent. Validate that the associated knowledge base, and any underlying data source, is owned and controlled by your organization.
AWS Bedrock Unauthorized Foundation Model Access Attempt
Identifies failed, access-denied attempts to enable account-level access to an Amazon Bedrock foundation model, either by granting a foundation-model entitlement, submitting a use case for model access, or creating a foundation-model agreement (accepting the EULA). These account-level "model access" actions unlock a foundation model so that it can subsequently be invoked. A principal that is repeatedly denied when attempting these actions may be a compromised or under-privileged identity probing for the ability to unlock expensive models (LLMjacking) or to establish a durable ability to invoke models. Unlike the companion rule that detects successful model-access grants, this rule surfaces the attempt itself, which is a high-signal indicator of credential boundary-testing even though access was not granted.
AWS Bedrock Unauthorized Resource-Based Policy Modification Attempt
Detects failed, access-denied attempts to modify or delete resource-based access policies on AWS Bedrock resources via the PutResourcePolicy and DeleteResourcePolicy API calls. Resource-based policies govern which principals (including external accounts) may access Bedrock resources such as agents, knowledge bases, and custom models. A principal that is repeatedly denied when attempting to attach or remove these policies may be a compromised or under-privileged identity probing for the ability to grant external or cross-account access, or to weaken existing access controls. Unlike the companion rule that detects successful changes, this rule surfaces the attempt itself, which is a high-signal indicator of credential boundary-testing even though no change occurred.
AWS Bedrock Untrusted Model Imported or Marketplace Endpoint Registered
Detects when an AWS Bedrock custom model is imported or deployed, or when a marketplace model endpoint is created or registered, via the CreateModelImportJob, CreateCustomModelDeployment, CreateMarketplaceModelEndpoint, or RegisterMarketplaceModelEndpoint API calls. These actions introduce a model artifact from outside the organization's trusted training and approval pipeline. A backdoored, poisoned, or attacker-supplied model that downstream applications subsequently invoke represents a software supply-chain compromise. New model imports and marketplace endpoint registrations should be validated for artifact provenance (S3 source ownership), the registering identity, and whether the model originates from an approved internal pipeline.
AWS CLI Command with Custom Endpoint URL
Detects the use of the AWS CLI with the "--endpoint-url" argument, which allows users to specify a custom endpoint URL for AWS services. This can be leveraged by adversaries to redirect API requests to non-standard or malicious endpoints, potentially bypassing typical security controls and logging mechanisms. This behavior may indicate an attempt to interact with unauthorized or compromised infrastructure, exfiltrate data, or perform other malicious activities under the guise of legitimate AWS operations.
AWS CloudShell Environment Created
Identifies the creation of a new AWS CloudShell environment. CloudShell is a browser-based shell that provides command-line access to AWS resources directly from the AWS Management Console. The CreateEnvironment API is called when a user launches CloudShell for the first time or when accessing CloudShell in a new AWS region. Adversaries with console access may use CloudShell to execute commands, install tools, or interact with AWS services without needing local CLI credentials. Monitoring environment creation helps detect unauthorized CloudShell usage from compromised console sessions.
AWS CloudTrail Log Created
Detects creation of a new AWS CloudTrail trail via CreateTrail API. While legitimate during onboarding or auditing improvements, adversaries can create trails that write to attacker-controlled destinations, limit regions, or otherwise subvert monitoring objectives. New trails should be validated for destination ownership, encryption, multi-region coverage, and organizational scope.
AWS CloudTrail Log Deleted
Detects deletion of an AWS CloudTrail trail via DeleteTrail API. Removing trails is a high-risk action that destroys an audit control plane and is frequently paired with other destructive or stealthy operations. Validate immediately and restore compliant logging.
AWS CloudTrail Log Evasion
Identifies the evasion of cloudtrail logging for IAM actions involving policy creation, modification or attachment. When making certain policy-related API calls, an adversary may pad the associated policy document with whitespaces to trigger CloudTrail’s logging size constraints, resulting in incomplete logging where critical details about the policy are omitted. By exploiting this gap, threat actors can bypass monitoring performed through CloudTrail and can effectively obscure unauthorized changes. This rule looks for IAM API calls with the requestParameters property containing reason:”requestParameters too large” and omitted:true.
AWS CloudTrail Log Suspended
Detects Cloudtrail logging suspension via StopLogging API. Stopping CloudTrail eliminates forward audit visibility and is a classic defense evasion step before sensitive changes or data theft. Investigate immediately and determine what occurred during the logging gap.
AWS CloudTrail Log Updated
Detects updates to an existing CloudTrail trail via UpdateTrail API which may reduce visibility, change destinations, or weaken integrity (e.g., removing global events, moving the S3 destination, or disabling validation). Adversaries can modify trails to evade detection while maintaining a semblance of logging. Validate any configuration change against approved baselines.
AWS CloudTrail Management Events Disabled via PutEventSelectors
Detects CloudTrail PutEventSelectors calls where the legacy event selectors explicitly set includeManagementEvents to false, disabling capture of all management API calls for that trail. Unlike StopLogging or DeleteTrail — which leave an obvious trace of the trail being stopped or removed entirely — this technique leaves the trail appearing active and healthy in the console while silently blinding defenders to subsequent IAM changes, credential operations, and resource abuse. This technique is documented in Stratus Red Team as aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-event-selectors and is a known pre-exfiltration step.
AWS CloudWatch Alarm Deletion
Detects the deletion of one or more Amazon CloudWatch alarms using the "DeleteAlarms" API. CloudWatch alarms are critical for monitoring metrics and triggering alerts when thresholds are exceeded. An adversary may delete alarms to impair visibility, silence alerts, and evade detection following malicious activity. This behavior may occur during post-exploitation or cleanup phases to remove traces of compromise or disable automated responses.
AWS CloudWatch Log Group Deletion
Detects the deletion of an Amazon CloudWatch Log Group using the "DeleteLogGroup" API. CloudWatch log groups store operational and security logs for AWS services and custom applications. Deleting a log group permanently removes all associated log streams and historical log data, which can eliminate forensic evidence and disrupt security monitoring pipelines. Adversaries may delete log groups to conceal malicious activity, disable log forwarding, or impede incident response.
AWS CloudWatch Log Stream Deletion
Detects the deletion of an Amazon CloudWatch log stream using the "DeleteLogStream" API. Deleting a log stream permanently removes its associated log events and may disrupt security visibility, break audit trails, or suppress forensic evidence. Adversaries may delete log streams to conceal malicious actions, impair monitoring pipelines, or remove artifacts generated during post-exploitation activity.
AWS Cognito Unauthenticated Identity Pool Credentials Issued
Identifies AWS CloudTrail data events where an unauthenticated identity successfully retrieves temporary AWS credentials from a Cognito Identity Pool via GetCredentialsForIdentity. Cognito Identity Pools can be configured to allow unauthenticated (guest) access, intended for scenarios like anonymous app analytics, but a pool that grants those anonymous identities meaningful IAM permissions becomes a public, unauthenticated path to real AWS credentials. Adversaries who discover an identity pool ID (often embedded in mobile app binaries, web app JavaScript, or public source repositories) can call GetId followed by GetCredentialsForIdentity with no login token at all to obtain temporary credentials, then use them to access whatever the pool's unauthenticated role permits. This is a New Terms rule that limits alerting to identity pools that have not been observed issuing credentials to an unauthenticated caller before, since some applications intentionally and continuously use guest access as part of normal operation.
AWS Config Resource Deletion
Identifies attempts to delete AWS Config resources. AWS Config provides continuous visibility into resource configuration changes and compliance posture across an account. Deleting Config components can significantly reduce security visibility and auditability. Adversaries may delete or disable Config resources to evade detection, hide prior activity, or weaken governance controls before or after other malicious actions.
AWS Configuration Recorder Stopped
Identifies when an AWS Config configuration recorder is stopped. AWS Config recorders continuously track and record configuration changes across supported AWS resources. Stopping the recorder immediately reduces visibility into infrastructure changes and can be abused by adversaries to evade detection, obscure follow-on activity, or weaken compliance and security monitoring controls.
AWS Credentials Searched For Inside A Container
This rule detects the use of system search utilities like grep and find to search for AWS credentials inside a container. Unauthorized access to these sensitive files could lead to further compromise of the container environment or facilitate a container breakout to the underlying cloud environment.