EXPLORE DETECTIONS
AWS EventBridge Rule Disabled or Deleted
Identifies when an Amazon EventBridge rule is disabled or deleted. EventBridge rules are commonly used to automate operational workflows and security-relevant routing (for example, forwarding events to Lambda, SNS/SQS, or security tooling). Disabling or deleting a rule can break critical integrations, suppress detections, and reduce visibility. Adversaries may intentionally impair EventBridge rules to disrupt monitoring, delay response, or hide follow-on actions.
AWS Excessive Security Scanning
The following analytic identifies excessive security scanning activities in AWS by detecting a high number of Describe, List, or Get API calls from a single user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to count distinct event names and flags users with more than 50 such events. This behavior is significant as it may indicate reconnaissance activities by an attacker attempting to map out your AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further exploitation of your cloud infrastructure.
AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity
The following analytic identifies anomalous GetObject API activity in AWS, indicating potential data exfiltration attempts. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs and uses the `anomalydetection` command to detect unusual patterns in the frequency of GetObject API calls by analyzing fields such as "count," "user_type," and "user_arn" within a 10-minute window. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized data access or exfiltration from S3 buckets. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exfiltrate sensitive data, leading to data breaches and compliance violations.
AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service
The following analytic identifies the creation of AWS Batch jobs that could potentially abuse the AWS Bucket Replication feature on S3 buckets. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect the `JobCreated` event, analyzing job details and their status. This activity is significant because attackers can exploit this feature to exfiltrate data by creating malicious batch jobs. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data transfer between S3 buckets, resulting in data breaches and loss of sensitive information.
AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication
The following analytic detects API calls to enable S3 bucket replication services. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `PutBucketReplication` events, focusing on fields like `bucketName`, `ReplicationConfiguration.Rule.Destination.Bucket`, and user details. This activity is significant as it can indicate unauthorized data replication, potentially leading to data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, attackers could replicate sensitive data to external accounts, leading to data breaches and compliance violations.
AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task
The following analytic detects the creation of an AWS DataSync task, which could indicate potential data exfiltration. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `CreateTask` event from the DataSync service. This activity is significant because attackers can misuse DataSync to transfer sensitive data from a private AWS location to a public one, leading to data compromise. If confirmed malicious, this could result in unauthorized access to sensitive information, causing severe data breaches and compliance violations.
AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot
The following analytic detects a series of AWS API calls related to EC2 snapshots within a short time window, indicating potential exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot modifications. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify actions such as creating, describing, and modifying snapshot attributes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to exfiltrate data by sharing EC2 snapshots externally. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain access to sensitive information stored in the snapshots, leading to data breaches and potential compliance violations.
AWS First Occurrence of STS GetFederationToken Request by User
Identifies the first occurrence of an AWS Security Token Service (STS) GetFederationToken request made by a user. The GetFederationToken API call allows users to request temporary security credentials to access AWS resources. The maximum expiration period for these tokens is 36 hours and they can be used to create a console signin token even for identities that don't already have one. Adversaries may use this API to obtain temporary credentials for persistence and to bypass IAM API call limitations by gaining console access.
AWS Glue Development Endpoint Activity
Detects possible suspicious glue development endpoint activity.
AWS GuardDuty Detector Deleted Or Updated
Detects successful deletion or disabling of an AWS GuardDuty detector, possibly by an attacker trying to avoid detection of its malicious activities. Upon deletion, GuardDuty stops monitoring the environment and all existing findings are lost. Verify with the user identity that this activity is legitimate.
AWS GuardDuty Detector Deletion
Detects the deletion of an Amazon GuardDuty detector. GuardDuty provides continuous monitoring for malicious or unauthorized activity across AWS accounts. Deleting the detector disables this visibility, stopping all threat detection and removing existing findings. Adversaries may delete GuardDuty detectors to impair security monitoring and evade detection during or after an intrusion. This rule identifies successful "DeleteDetector" API calls and can indicate a deliberate defense evasion attempt.
AWS GuardDuty Important Change
Detects updates of the GuardDuty list of trusted IPs, perhaps to disable security alerts against malicious IPs.
AWS GuardDuty Member Account Manipulation
Detects attempts to disassociate or manipulate Amazon GuardDuty member accounts within an AWS organization. In multi-account GuardDuty deployments, a delegated administrator account aggregates findings from member accounts. Adversaries may attempt to disassociate member accounts, delete member relationships, stop monitoring members, or delete pending invitations to break this centralized visibility. These actions can be precursors to or alternatives for deleting GuardDuty detectors entirely, allowing attackers to operate undetected in member accounts while the administrator account loses visibility. This rule identifies successful API calls that manipulate GuardDuty member relationships, which are rare in normal operations and warrant immediate investigation.
AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User
The following analytic detects an AWS account experiencing more than 20 failed authentication attempts within a 5-minute window. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify multiple failed ConsoleLogin events. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack targeting the account. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could potentially gain unauthorized access, leading to data breaches or further exploitation of the AWS environment. Security teams should consider adjusting the threshold based on their specific environment to reduce false positives.
AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip
The following analytic detects an IP address with 20 or more failed authentication attempts to the AWS Web Console within a 5-minute window. This detection leverages CloudTrail logs, aggregating failed login events by IP address and time span. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack aimed at gaining unauthorized access or escalating privileges within an AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation of AWS resources.
AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events
The following analytic identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe for IAM users in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect multiple failed access attempts from the same source IP and user identity. This activity is significant as it may indicate that an access key has been compromised and is being misused for unauthorized discovery actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gather information about the AWS environment, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation.
AWS IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attached to Group
An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by attaching additional permissions to user groups the compromised user account belongs to. This rule looks for use of the IAM AttachGroupPolicy API operation to attach the highly permissive AdministratorAccess AWS managed policy to an existing IAM user group.
AWS IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attached to Role
An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by attaching additional permissions to compromised IAM roles. This rule looks for use of the IAM AttachRolePolicy API operation to attach the highly permissive AdministratorAccess AWS managed policy to an existing IAM role.
AWS IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attached to User
An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by attaching additional permissions to compromised user accounts. This rule looks for use of the IAM AttachUserPolicy API operation to attach the highly permissive AdministratorAccess AWS managed policy to an existing IAM user.
AWS IAM API Calls via Temporary Session Tokens
Detects sensitive AWS IAM API operations executed using temporary session credentials (access key IDs beginning with "ASIA"). Temporary credentials are commonly issued through sts:GetSessionToken, sts:AssumeRole, or AWS SSO logins and are meant for short-term use. It is unusual for legitimate users or automated processes to perform privileged IAM actions (e.g., creating users, updating policies, or enabling/disabling MFA) with session tokens. This behavior may indicate credential theft, session hijacking, or the abuse of a privileged role’s temporary credentials.
AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force
The following analytic detects multiple failed attempts to assume an AWS IAM role, indicating a potential brute force attack. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `MalformedPolicyDocumentException` errors with a status of `failure` and filters out legitimate AWS services. This activity is significant as repeated failures to assume roles can indicate an adversary attempting to guess role names, which is a precursor to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and services.
AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Update
Identifies AWS CloudTrail events where an IAM role's trust policy has been updated by an IAM user or Assumed Role identity. The trust policy is a JSON document that defines which principals are allowed to assume the role. An attacker may attempt to modify this policy to gain the privileges of the role. This is a New Terms rule, which means it will only trigger once for each unique combination of the "cloud.account.id", "user.name" and "entity.target.id" fields, that have not been seen making this API request.
AWS IAM Backdoor Users Keys
Detects AWS API key creation for a user by another user. Backdoored users can be used to obtain persistence in the AWS environment. Also with this alert, you can detect a flow of AWS keys in your org.
AWS IAM CompromisedKeyQuarantine Policy Attached to User
This rule looks for use of the IAM `AttachUserPolicy` API operation to attach the `CompromisedKeyQuarantine` or `CompromisedKeyQuarantineV2` AWS managed policies to an existing IAM user. This policy denies access to certain actions and is applied by the AWS team in the event that an IAM user's credentials have been compromised or exposed publicly.