EXPLORE DETECTIONS
Entra ID PowerShell Sign-in
Identifies a sign-in using the Azure Active Directory PowerShell module. PowerShell for Azure Active Directory allows for managing settings from the command line, which is intended for users who are members of an admin role.
Entra ID Privileged Identity Management (PIM) Role Modified
Azure Active Directory (AD) Privileged Identity Management (PIM) is a service that enables you to manage, control, and monitor access to important resources in an organization. PIM can be used to manage the built-in Azure resource roles such as Global Administrator and Application Administrator. An adversary may add a user to a PIM role in order to maintain persistence in their target's environment or modify a PIM role to weaken their target's security controls.
Entra ID Protection - Risk Detection - Sign-in Risk
Identifies sign-in risk detection events via Microsofts Entra ID Protection service. Entra ID Protection detects sign-in activity such as anonymized IP addresses, unlikely travel, password spray, and more.
Entra ID Protection - Risk Detection - User Risk
Identifies user risk detection events via Microsofts Entra ID Protection service. Entra ID Protection detects user risk activity such as anonymized IP addresses, unlikely travel, password spray, and more.
Entra ID Protection Admin Confirmed Compromise
Identifies when an administrator has manually confirmed a user or sign-in as compromised in Microsoft Entra ID Protection. This indicates that an administrator has reviewed the risk detection and determined that the user account or sign-in activity is definitively compromised. This is a high-confidence indicator of account compromise and should be investigated immediately.
Entra ID Protection Alerts for User Detected
Identifies more than two Microsoft Entra ID Protection alerts associated to the user principal in a short time period. Microsoft Entra ID Protection alerts are triggered by suspicious sign-in activity, such as anomalous IP addresses, risky sign-ins, or other risk detections. Multiple alerts in a short time frame may indicate an ongoing attack or compromised account.
Entra ID Protection User Alert and Device Registration
Identifies sequence of events where a Microsoft Entra ID protection alert is followed by an attempt to register a new device by the same user principal. This behavior may indicate an adversary using a compromised account to register a device, potentially leading to unauthorized access to resources or persistence in the environment.
Entra ID Register Device with Unusual User Agent (Azure AD Join)
Detects successful Microsoft Entra ID audit events for Register device where additional details indicate an Azure AD join and the recorded user agent is not one of the common native registration clients (Dsreg, DeviceRegistrationClient, or Dalvik-based Android enrollment). Legitimate Windows and standard mobile enrollment flows often present predictable user-agent strings; unexpected clients may reflect scripted registration, third-party tooling, or adversary-driven device registration used for persistence or token abuse. Baseline approved provisioning tools and MDM integrations before tuning.
Entra ID ROPC Authentication with Unknown Client ID
Identifies potential OAuth client ID spoofing in Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs. Adversaries submit fabricated or non-existent application identifiers (client IDs) in Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) authentication requests to the token endpoint. Because Entra ID validates the submitted credential before rejecting the request on application resolution, the resulting error code acts as a credential- and account-validity oracle while never producing a successful sign-in. By fragmenting attempts across many fictional application identifiers, adversaries evade per-application detections, rate limiting, and application-scoped Conditional Access. This rule detects a ROPC authentication that fails with error code 700016 (application not found in the directory) where no application display name resolves, which is characteristic of a spoofed client ID used for stealthy user enumeration and password spraying.
Entra ID Service Principal Created
Identifies when a new service principal is added in Microsoft Entra ID. An application, hosted service, or automated tool that accesses or modifies resources needs an identity created. This identity is known as a service principal. For security reasons, it's always recommended to use service principals with automated tools rather than allowing them to log in with a user identity.
Entra ID Service Principal Credentials Created by Unusual User
Identifies when new Service Principal credentials have been added in Microsoft Entra ID. In most organizations, credentials will be added to service principals infrequently. Hijacking an application (by adding a rogue secret or certificate) with granted permissions will allow the attacker to access data that is normally protected by MFA requirements.
Entra ID Service Principal Federated Credential Authentication by Unusual Client
Identifies when a service principal authenticates using a federated identity credential for the first time in the historical window. This indicates that Entra ID validated a JWT token potentially against an external OIDC identity provider and issued an access token. While legitimate for CI/CD workflows (GitHub Actions, Azure DevOps), adversaries may abuse this by configuring rogue identity providers (BYOIDP) to authenticate as compromised applications. First-time federated credential usage for a service principal warrants investigation to determine if the external identity provider is legitimate.
Entra ID Service Principal with Unusual Source ASN
Identifies Entra ID service principal sign-ins where the workload identity and source autonomous system number (ASN) together have not appeared in recent history. Attackers who obtain application secrets or tokens often authenticate from unfamiliar hosting providers, residential or VPN egress, or networks outside normal automation footprints, which can precede data access, lateral movement, or ransomware activity in the tenant. The detection emphasizes first-seen network context for non-interactive workload identities.
Entra ID Sharepoint or OneDrive Accessed by Unusual Client
Identifies when an application accesses SharePoint Online or OneDrive for Business for the first time in the tenant within a specified timeframe. This detects successful OAuth phishing campaigns, illicit consent grants, or compromised third-party applications gaining initial access to file storage. Adversaries often use malicious OAuth applications or phishing techniques to gain consent from users, allowing persistent access to organizational data repositories without traditional credential theft.
Entra ID Sign-in BloodHound Suite User-Agent Detected
Identifies potential enumeration activity using AzureHound, SharpHound, or BloodHound across Microsoft cloud services. These tools are often used by red teamers and adversaries to map users, groups, roles, applications, and access relationships within Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) and Microsoft 365.
Entra ID Sign-in Brute Force Attempted (Microsoft 365)
Identifies potential brute-force attacks targeting Microsoft 365 user accounts by analyzing failed sign-in patterns in Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs. This detection focuses on a high volume of failed interactive or non-interactive authentication attempts within a short time window, often indicative of password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing. Adversaries may use these techniques to gain unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services such as Exchange Online, SharePoint, or Teams.
Entra ID Sign-in TeamFiltration User-Agent Detected
Identifies potential enumeration or password spraying activity using TeamFiltration tool. TeamFiltration is an open-source enumeration, password spraying and exfiltration tool designed for Entra ID and Microsoft 365. Adversaries are known to use TeamFiltration in-the-wild to enumerate users, groups, and roles, as well as to perform password spraying attacks against Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft 365 accounts. This rule detects the use of TeamFiltration by monitoring for specific user-agent strings associated with the tool in Azure and Microsoft 365 logs.
Entra ID Temporary Access Pass Created for User
Identifies the creation of a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) for an Entra ID user account. A TAP is a time-limited passcode that allows passwordless authentication and bypasses existing MFA requirements, including phishing-resistant methods. An attacker with User Administrator or Authentication Administrator privileges can issue a TAP for a target account, sign in without the current password, and register new persistent authentication methods before the TAP expires.
Entra ID Unusual Cloud Device Registration
Detects a sequence of events in Microsoft Entra ID indicative of suspicious cloud-based device registration via automated tooling like ROADtools or similar frameworks. This behavior involves adding a device via the Device Registration Service, followed by the assignment of registered users and owners — a pattern consistent with techniques used to establish persistence or acquire a Primary Refresh Token (PRT). ROADtools and similar tooling leave distinct telemetry signatures such as the `Microsoft.OData.Client` user agent. These sequences are uncommon in typical user behavior and may reflect abuse of device trust for session hijacking or silent token replay.
Entra ID User Added as Registered Application Owner
Identifies when a user is added as an owner for an Azure application. An adversary may add a user account as an owner for an Azure application in order to grant additional permissions and modify the application's configuration using another account.
Entra ID User Added as Service Principal Owner
Identifies when a user is added as an owner for an Azure service principal. The service principal object defines what the application can do in the specific tenant, who can access the application, and what resources the app can access. A service principal object is created when an application is given permission to access resources in a tenant. An adversary may add a user account as an owner for a service principal and use that account in order to define what an application can do in the Azure AD tenant.
Entra ID User Reported Suspicious Activity
Identifies suspicious activity reported by users in Microsoft Entra ID where users have reported suspicious activity related to their accounts, which may indicate potential compromise or unauthorized access attempts. Reported suspicious activity typically occurs during the authentication process and may involve various authentication methods, such as password resets, account recovery, or multi-factor authentication challenges. Adversaries may attempt to exploit user accounts by leveraging social engineering techniques or other methods to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or resources.
Entra ID User Sign-in Brute Force Attempted
Identifies potential brute-force attacks targeting user accounts by analyzing failed sign-in patterns in Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs. This detection focuses on a high volume of failed interactive or non-interactive authentication attempts within a short time window, often indicative of password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing. Adversaries may use these techniques to gain unauthorized access to applications integrated with Entra ID or to compromise valid user accounts.
Entra ID User Sign-In via Unusual Legacy Authentication Client
Detects a successful sign-in by a Member user principal through a legacy authentication client (such as Authenticated SMTP, IMAP4, POP3, Exchange ActiveSync, Exchange Web Services, or other basic-authentication clients) in Microsoft Entra ID, where the user principal has not been seen using a legacy client in the last 7 days. Legacy authentication clients rely on basic authentication, do not support modern authentication or interactive multi-factor authentication, and are frequently abused by adversaries for password spraying and account takeover because they translate into single-factor Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) grants. This is a New Terms rule that surfaces the first occurrence of legacy client authentication for a given user, which is unusual in most modern environments.