EXPLORE DETECTIONS
Entra ID High Risk User Sign-in Heuristic
Identifies high risk Azure Active Directory (AD) sign-ins by leveraging Microsoft Identity Protection machine learning and heuristics.
Entra ID Illicit Consent Grant via Registered Application
Identifies an illicit consent grant request on-behalf-of a registered Entra ID application. Adversaries may create and register an application in Microsoft Entra ID for the purpose of requesting user consent to access resources. This is accomplished by tricking a user into granting consent to the application, typically via a pre-made phishing URL. This establishes an OAuth grant that allows the malicious client applocation to access resources on-behalf-of the user.
Entra ID Kali365 Default User-Agent Detected
Identifies the default user agent string associated with Kali365 (also referred to as Kali365 Live), a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform that automates OAuth 2.0 device code phishing and adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session capture against Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Entra ID. The Kali365 Electron desktop client identifies itself with the user agent `kali365-live/1.0.0` when polling for and replaying captured OAuth tokens, so its appearance in Entra ID sign-in logs, Entra ID audit logs, or the Microsoft 365 unified audit log indicates that an attacker-controlled Kali365 client is interacting with the tenant using stolen tokens. Unlike dual-use offensive tooling, Kali365 is a criminal service with no legitimate enterprise use, making this user agent a high-fidelity indicator of active account compromise.
Entra ID MFA Disabled for User
Identifies when multi-factor authentication (MFA) is disabled for an Entra ID user account. An adversary may disable MFA for a user account in order to weaken the authentication requirements for the account.
Entra ID MFA TOTP Brute Force Attempted
Identifies brute force attempts against Azure Entra multi-factor authentication (MFA) Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) verification codes. This rule detects high frequency failed TOTP code attempts for a single user in a short time-span with a high number of distinct session IDs. Adversaries may programmatically attemopt to brute-force TOTP codes by generating several sessions and attempt to guess the correct code.
Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker DRS Sign-In from Suspicious ASN
Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-in activity where the Microsoft Authentication Broker requests the Device Registration Service from a source autonomous system number (ASN) associated with VPN, residential proxy, or hosting egress commonly observed in OAuth phishing and adversary-in-the-middle device registration flows. This pattern can indicate device join or primary refresh token acquisition staged from attacker-controlled infrastructure after a user completes authentication.
Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker Sign-In to Unusual Resource
Detects successful Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins where the client application is the Microsoft Authentication Broker (MAB) and the requested resource identifier is outside a short list of commonly observed first-party targets. Attackers abuse the broker in phishing and token broker flows to obtain tokens for unexpected APIs or enterprise applications. The exclusion list covers legacy Azure Active Directory, Microsoft Graph, Device Registration Service, Microsoft Intune Enrollment, extend or tune exclusions for your tenant after baselining broker traffic.
Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker Sign-In with Non-Standard User Agent
Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-in activity where the Microsoft Authentication Broker authenticates is using a user agent that is not consistent with common browser, mobile, or Windows platform authentication clients. Adversary-in-the-middle and OAuth phishing tooling often presents scripted or relayed user agents (for example Node.js, Python, or generic HTTP libraries) while still targeting first-party resources through the broker.
Entra ID Multiple Device Registrations by a Single User
Detects multiple Microsoft Entra ID device registrations by a single user, where three or more distinct devices are registered within a 15-minute window. A legitimate user enrolling a device produces a single "Register device" event; registering multiple distinct devices in quick succession is uncommon and is the fingerprint behavior of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kits and stolen-token replay tooling (for example Kali365), which mint a new Azure AD-joined device, and therefore a new Primary Refresh Token (PRT), per relay or replay attempt. Each registered device is a separate certificate-bound principal whose PRT survives user-level session revocation and password resets, so multiple registrations on a single low-privilege identity establish device-bound persistence at scale.
Entra ID OAuth Application Redirect URI Modified
Identifies modifications to OAuth application redirect URIs (ReplyUrls) in Entra ID. Adding an attacker-controlled redirect URI to an existing trusted application allows interception of OAuth authorization codes when users authenticate through that application's normal login flow, enabling token theft without requiring a new application registration or consent event.
Entra ID OAuth Authorization Code Grant for Unusual User, App, and Resource
Identifies the first occurrence of an OAuth 2.0 authorization code grant flow for a specific combination of client application, target resource, and user principal in Microsoft Entra ID. Developer tools like Azure CLI, Visual Studio Code, and Azure PowerShell accessing Microsoft Graph or legacy Azure AD are flagged for infrequent or first time usage by a user. Additionally, any FOCI (Family of Client IDs) application accessing the deprecated Windows Azure Active Directory for the first time is flagged since this resource is rarely accessed legitimately. This pattern is indicative of OAuth phishing attacks like ConsentFix, where attackers steal authorization codes and exchange them for tokens from attacker controlled infrastructure.
Entra ID OAuth Device Code Flow with Concurrent Sign-ins
Identifies Entra ID device code authentication flows where multiple user agents are observed within the same session. This pattern is indicative of device code phishing, where an attacker's polling client (e.g., Python script) and the victim's browser both appear in the same authentication session. In legitimate device code flows, the user authenticates via browser while the requesting application polls for tokens - when these have distinctly different user agents (e.g., Python Requests vs Chrome), it may indicate the code was phished and redeemed by an attacker.
Entra ID OAuth Device Code Grant by Microsoft Authentication Broker
Identifies device code authentication with an Azure broker client for Entra ID. Adversaries abuse Primary Refresh Tokens (PRTs) to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) and gain unauthorized access to Azure resources. PRTs are used in Conditional Access policies to enforce device-based controls. Compromising PRTs allows attackers to bypass these policies and gain unauthorized access. This rule detects successful sign-ins using device code authentication with the Entra ID broker client application ID (29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e).
Entra ID OAuth Device Code Grant by Unusual User
Identifies when a user is observed for the first time authenticating using the device code authentication workflow. This authentication workflow can be abused by attackers to phish users and steal access tokens to impersonate the victim. By its very nature, device code should only be used when logging in to devices without keyboards, where it is difficult to enter emails and passwords. This rule only applies to Entra ID user types and detects new users leveraging this flow.
Entra ID OAuth Device Code Phishing via AiTM
Detects successful Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins that use the OAuth device code authentication protocol with the Microsoft Authentication Broker client requesting first-party Office API resources (Exchange Online, Microsoft Graph, or SharePoint) while flagged as interactive. This pattern is associated with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kits such as Tycoon 2FA, where victims complete device code flows that ultimately broker tokens for mail and collaboration APIs.
Entra ID OAuth Device Code Sign-in to Azure AD Graph Enumeration
Correlates a successful Entra ID device-code sign-in to the legacy Azure AD Graph audience (00000002-0000-0000-c000-000000000000) from an unmanaged device with directory enumeration against graph.windows.net by the same user within a short window. Device-code phishing is the dominant OAuth phishing variant against Microsoft tenants: the adversary initiates the flow, relays the user-facing code to the victim, and on redemption walks away with an access or refresh token bound to the targeted resource without ever handling the user's password or MFA factor. When the redeemed audience is AAD Graph and the redeeming device is unmanaged, the follow-on Graph traffic is the compromised cloud account being used by the attacker, not by the user. This rule fires when that token is immediately turned around against the directory under the same identity to read user, group, service principal, application, role assignment, directory object, policy, OAuth permission grant, or tenant detail collections.
Entra ID OAuth Flow by Microsoft Authentication Broker to Device Registration Service (DRS)
Identifies separate OAuth authorization flows in Microsoft Entra ID where the same user principal and session ID are observed across multiple IP addresses within a 5-minute window. These flows involve the Microsoft Authentication Broker (MAB) as the client application and the Device Registration Service (DRS) as the target resource. This pattern is highly indicative of OAuth phishing activity, where an adversary crafts a legitimate Microsoft login URL to trick a user into completing authentication and sharing the resulting authorization code, which is then exchanged for an access and refresh token by the attacker.
Entra ID OAuth Phishing via First-Party Microsoft Application
Detects potentially suspicious OAuth authorization activity in Microsoft Entra ID where first-party Microsoft applications from the FOCI (Family of Client IDs) group request access to Microsoft Graph or legacy Azure AD resources. Developer tools like Azure CLI, Visual Studio Code, and Azure PowerShell accessing these resources are flagged, as they are commonly abused in phishing campaigns like ConsentFix. Additionally, any FOCI family application accessing the deprecated Windows Azure Active Directory resource is flagged since this API is rarely used legitimately and attackers target it for stealth. First-party apps are trusted by default in all tenants and cannot be blocked, making them ideal for OAuth phishing attacks.
Entra ID OAuth PRT Issuance to Non-Managed Device Detected
Identifies when a user signs in with a refresh token using the Microsoft Authentication Broker (MAB) client, followed by a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) sign-in from the same device within 1 hour from an unmanaged device. This pattern may indicate that an attacker has successfully registered a device using ROADtx and transitioned from short-term token access to long-term persistent access via PRTs. Excluding access to the Device Registration Service (DRS) ensures the PRT is being used beyond registration, often to access Microsoft 365 resources like Outlook or SharePoint.
Entra ID OAuth ROPC Grant Login Detected
Detects unusual resource owner password credential (ROPC) login attempts by a user principal in Microsoft Entra ID. ROPC is a legacy authentication flow that allows applications to obtain tokens by directly providing user credentials. This method is less secure and can be exploited by adversaries to gain access to user accounts without requiring multi-factor authentication (MFA), especially during enumeration or password spraying. This is a New Terms rule that identifies when user principals are involved in ROPC login attempts, not seen before in the last 10 days, indicating potential abuse or unusual activity.
Entra ID OAuth User Impersonation to Microsoft Graph
Identifies potential session hijacking or token replay in Microsoft Entra ID. This rule detects cases where a user signs in and subsequently accesses Microsoft Graph from a different IP address using the same session ID. This may indicate a successful OAuth phishing attack, session hijacking, or token replay attack, where an adversary has stolen a session cookie or refresh/access token and is impersonating the user from an alternate host or location.
Entra ID OAuth user_impersonation Scope for Unusual User and Client
Identifies rare occurrences of OAuth workflow for a user principal that is single factor authenticated, with an OAuth scope containing user_impersonation for a token issued by Entra ID. Adversaries may use this scope to gain unauthorized access to user accounts, particularly when the sign-in session status is unbound, indicating that the session is not associated with a specific device or session. This behavior is indicative of potential account compromise or unauthorized access attempts. This rule flags when this pattern is detected for a user principal that has not been seen in the last 10 days, indicating potential abuse or unusual activity.
Entra ID Phishing Kit Default OS Build (Entity Analytics)
Identifies the first occurrence of a Microsoft Entra ID device, surfaced through the Entra ID Entity Analytics device inventory, whose host name follows the default "DESKTOP-" pattern and whose operating system build is "10.0.19045.2006". This is the frozen default device profile observed when adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kits such as Tycoon2FA and Kali365 register Azure AD-joined devices after capturing a victim session, in order to acquire a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) and establish persistence. The build is hardcoded by the tooling and differs from legitimate hosts: a patched Windows 10 22H2 device reports a far higher "10.0.19045.<revision>" value, so a device frozen at ".2006" with a default name is a high-fidelity, though evadable, indicator.
Entra ID Potential AiTM Sign-In via OfficeHome (Tycoon2FA)
Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins consistent with Tycoon2FA phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) activity: the Microsoft Authentication Broker requesting tokens for Microsoft Graph or Exchange Online, or the Office web client application authenticating to itself, combined with Node.js-style user agents (node, axios, undici). Tycoon 2FA bypasses MFA by relaying authentication and capturing session material, often targeting Microsoft 365 and Gmail. Baseline legitimate automation and developer tooling before tuning.