EXPLORE DETECTIONS
Anomalous Linux Compiler Activity
Looks for compiler activity by a user context which does not normally run compilers. This can be the result of ad-hoc software changes or unauthorized software deployment. This can also be due to local privilege elevation via locally run exploits or malware activity.
Anomalous Process For a Linux Population
Searches for rare processes running on multiple Linux hosts in an entire fleet or network. This reduces the detection of false positives since automated maintenance processes usually only run occasionally on a single machine but are common to all or many hosts in a fleet.
Anomalous Process For a Windows Population
Searches for rare processes running on multiple hosts in an entire fleet or network. This reduces the detection of false positives since automated maintenance processes usually only run occasionally on a single machine but are common to all or many hosts in a fleet.
Anomalous Windows Process Creation
Identifies unusual parent-child process relationships that can indicate malware execution or persistence mechanisms. Malicious scripts often call on other applications and processes as part of their exploit payload. For example, when a malicious Office document runs scripts as part of an exploit payload, Excel or Word may start a script interpreter process, which, in turn, runs a script that downloads and executes malware. Another common scenario is Outlook running an unusual process when malware is downloaded in an email. Monitoring and identifying anomalous process relationships is a method of detecting new and emerging malware that is not yet recognized by anti-virus scanners.
Anthropic Activity from a Suspicious User Agent
Detects successful Anthropic audit activity where the user agent matches scripting HTTP clients, offensive scanners, or automation libraries (for example curl, python-requests, Go-http-client, axios, nuclei). Browser and first-party Claude clients normally present recognizable browser or product user agents; raw HTTP library agents on successful control-plane or product activity often indicate scripted access, stolen-session reuse, or unauthorized automation. Known benign automation patterns (axios or Go HTTP clients on file upload/delete, trusted device enrollment, and environment creation) are excluded.
Anthropic Admin API Key Created
Admin API keys grant programmatic access to organization and compliance APIs outside an interactive browser session. An attacker who creates one after compromise can automate role grants, exports, and logging changes without holding a user session that would time out under SSO. The key also survives password resets and IdP lockout if defenders revoke the interactive account but miss the API credential.
Anthropic Admin API Key Deleted
Admin API keys grant programmatic access to organization and compliance APIs. An attacker can delete legitimate admin API keys to break security monitoring or integrations, or to cover tracks after creating replacement credentials they control. Deletion without a nearby rotation event points more at sabotage than routine key hygiene.
Anthropic Admin Role Assigned to User
The organization admin role controls organization settings, integrations, membership, and security configuration in Anthropic Claude for Enterprise. Membership role changes are reported as `claude_user_role_updated` with `anthropic.audit.current_role`. An attacker can promote a compromised or newly invited account to org admin to turn initial access into durable control-plane access. From admin, they can disable SSO, mint admin API keys for automation, start data exports, and weaken audit logging. Workspace-scoped `role_assignment_granted` grants (for example bare `admin` on a workspace) are out of scope for this rule.
Anthropic Artifact Shared Publicly
Claude artifacts can be shared with specific audiences. Making an artifact public exposes its contents to unauthenticated viewers on the internet. An attacker with access to sensitive artifacts can publish them publicly to push intellectual property, credentials embedded in prompts, or other confidential material outside organizational controls.
Anthropic Compliance API Key Created
Compliance-scoped API keys read organization audit activity and compliance data. Once an attacker has administrative access, creating one gives them programmatic read of chats, files, and membership without an interactive session. This is separate from admin API key creation, which covers organization administration rather than compliance read scopes.
Anthropic Compliance API Logging Disabled
Compliance API logging feeds the anthropic.audit dataset that Anthropic audit detections run on. An attacker with administrative access can disable it so later role grants, API key creation, exports, and authentication changes stop reaching this data source. This rule detects the disable action itself. Activity that happens after logging stops may not appear in logs-anthropic.audit-*.
Anthropic Compliance Audit Log Export Accessed
An audit log export archive was accessed, meaning the actor downloaded exported audit activity. Attackers pull audit exports to see what defenders can observe, look for detection gaps, or remove evidence before making other control-plane changes.
Anthropic Excessive Chat Access Failures
Detects a single authenticated user generating an unusually high number of denied Claude chat access attempts in a 24-hour window. That pattern fits automated chat enumeration or attempts to reach conversations outside the actor's permissions. Unauthenticated shared-link actors lack user.id and are excluded.
Anthropic Excessive Chat Creation
Detects an unusually high number of Claude chat creation events for the same user email within a 24-hour period. Burst chat creation can indicate automated LLM abuse, resource hijacking to burn organizational quotas, or scripted workflows used to stage many parallel conversations for data processing or prompt-injection campaigns.
Anthropic Excessive Chat Deletion
Detects an unusually high number of Claude chat deletion events for the same user email within a single calendar day. Mass chat deletion can indicate an attempt to remove conversation history, cover tracks after misuse of Claude, or automated cleanup following data staging or prompt abuse.
Anthropic Excessive Chat Snapshot Creation
Detects an unusually high number of successful Claude chat snapshot creation events for the same user email within a rolling 24-hour window. Chat snapshots package conversation content into shareable exports; sustained creation volume can indicate staging of organizational chat data for exfiltration via Anthropic's web service or automated bulk export of sensitive prompts and responses.
Anthropic Extra Usage Spend Limit Deleted
Extra usage spend limits cap Anthropic organizational spend beyond included usage. Deleting a spend limit removes that cap and can enable unrestricted API or Claude consumption. An attacker who already has administrative or API access can delete the limit to burn budget, run large automated workloads, or stage resource abuse without the previous guardrail.
Anthropic High File Upload Activity
Detects an unusually high volume of Claude file uploads from the same user email and source IP within a rolling 24-hour period. Sustained upload activity can indicate staging of sensitive documents in Claude chats for later retrieval, automated ingestion of data into LLM workflows, or abuse of organizational Claude access to move files into the cloud service.
Anthropic Impossible Travel Login
Detects successful Anthropic magic link or SSO sign-ins for the same user email from source IP addresses whose query-time geo-locations (via IP_LOCATION) are separated by at least 1,000 km, with implied travel faster than 800 km/h, within a 24-hour window. That pattern can indicate account sharing, VPN or proxy egress mismatches, or an adversary authenticating from a geography far from the legitimate user's baseline.
Anthropic Magic Link Second Factor Disabled
Magic link second factor adds an extra authentication step to passwordless sign-in for Anthropic. An attacker with administrative access can turn it off so magic link logins no longer require the second factor, which makes stolen or attacker-controlled mailboxes usable for interactive access. This often shows up alongside SSO weakening when the attacker wants a fallback authentication path outside the corporate IdP.
Anthropic MCP Server Created
Detects the first successful creation of a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server integration name in an Anthropic organization within the rule history window. MCP servers add external data pathways into Claude and can expose organizational data to third-party infrastructure. This is a New Terms rule keyed on `organization.id` and `anthropic.audit.mcp_server_name` so the same connector name can still alert in another tenant, while routine re-creation of an already-seen name in the same organization does not.
Anthropic Multiple Authentication Failures
Detects at least five failed Anthropic authentication events for the same user email within one hour. Failures are matched by authentication category and failure outcome (for example magic-link or SSO login failures). That pattern fits repeated guessing, stale magic link abuse, or automated login attempts against one account.
Anthropic Organization Data Export Accessed
Starting an organization data export only signals intent. Accessing the export archive via its signed URL means the actor actually downloaded chats, projects, user metadata, and configuration. An attacker with administrative access can use this to exfiltrate intellectual property and credentials at scale.
Anthropic Organization Deletion
Organization deletion and bulk delete remove tenant data, projects, and member access in a single administrative action. An attacker can use this to break AI-assisted workflows as an impact technique, to extort the organization, or to destroy evidence after finishing a data export. Once deletion progresses, recovery options shrink and earlier exfiltration activity is harder to reconstruct from the tenant itself.