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ServicePrincipalAddedToRole [Nobelium]
One of the indicators of compromise for the Nobelium (formerly Solorigate) campaign was that unexpected service principals have been added to privileged roles. This query looks for service principals that have been added to any role.
Detection Query
let queryTime = 1d;
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(queryTime)
| where Application == "Office 365"
| where ActionType == "Add member to role."
| extend EntityType = RawEventData.Target[2].ID, RoleName = RawEventData.ModifiedProperties[1].NewValue, RoleId = RawEventData.ModifiedProperties[2].NewValue
| where EntityType == "ServicePrincipal"
| project Timestamp , ActionType, ServicePrincipalName = RawEventData.Target[3].ID, ServicePrincipalId = RawEventData.Target[1].ID, RoleName, RoleId, ActorId = AccountObjectId , ActorDisplayName = AccountDisplayNameData Sources
CloudAppEvents
Platforms
microsoft-defender
Tags
privilege-escalationiocanomaly
Raw Content
# ServicePrincipalAddedToRole [Nobelium]
One of the indicators of compromise for the Nobelium (formerly Solorigate) campaign was that unexpected service principals have been added to privileged roles. This query looks for service principals that have been added to any role.
See [*Understanding "Solorigate"'s Identity IOCs - for Identity Vendors and their customers.*](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-active-directory-identity/understanding-quot-solorigate-quot-s-identity-iocs-for-identity/ba-p/2007610).
## Query
```kusto
let queryTime = 1d;
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(queryTime)
| where Application == "Office 365"
| where ActionType == "Add member to role."
| extend EntityType = RawEventData.Target[2].ID, RoleName = RawEventData.ModifiedProperties[1].NewValue, RoleId = RawEventData.ModifiedProperties[2].NewValue
| where EntityType == "ServicePrincipal"
| project Timestamp , ActionType, ServicePrincipalName = RawEventData.Target[3].ID, ServicePrincipalId = RawEventData.Target[1].ID, RoleName, RoleId, ActorId = AccountObjectId , ActorDisplayName = AccountDisplayName
```
## Category
This query can be used to detect the following attack techniques and tactics ([see MITRE ATT&CK framework](https://attack.mitre.org/)) or security configuration states.
| Technique, tactic, or state | Covered? (v=yes) | Notes |
|------------------------|----------|-------|
| Initial access | | |
| Execution | | |
| Persistence | | |
| Privilege escalation | V | |
| Defense evasion | | |
| Credential Access | | |
| Discovery | | |
| Lateral movement | | |
| Collection | | |
| Command and control | | |
| Exfiltration | | |
| Impact | | |
| Vulnerability | | |
| Misconfiguration | | |
| Malware, component | | |
## See also
* [Locate Nobelium implant receiving DNS response](../Campaigns/c2-lookup-from-nonbrowser[Nobelium].md)
* [Locate Nobelium implant receiving DNS response](../Campaigns/c2-lookup-response[Nobelium].md)
* [Compromised certificate [Nobelium]](../Campaigns/compromised-certificate[Nobelium].md)
* [FireEye Red Team tool CVEs [Nobelium]](../Campaigns/fireeye-red-team-tools-CVEs%20[Nobelium].md)
* [FireEye Red Team tool HASHs [Nobelium]](../Campaigns/fireeye-red-team-tools-HASHs%20[Nobelium].md)
* [View data on software identified as affected by Nobelium campaign](../Campaigns/known-affected-software-orion[Nobelium].md)
* [Locate SolarWinds processes launching suspicious PowerShell commands](../Campaigns/launching-base64-powershell[Nobelium].md)
* [Locate SolarWinds processes launching command prompt with the echo command](../Campaigns/launching-cmd-echo[Nobelium].md)
* [Locate Nobelium-related malicious DLLs created in the system or locally](../Campaigns/locate-dll-created-locally[Nobelium].md)
* [Locate Nobelium-related malicious DLLs loaded in memory](../Campaigns/locate-dll-loaded-in-memory[Nobelium].md)
* [Get an inventory of SolarWinds Orion software possibly affected by Nobelium](../Campaigns/possible-affected-software-orion[Nobelium].md)
* [Anomalous use of MailItemAccess on other users' mailboxes [Nobelium]](../Collection/Anomaly%20of%20MailItemAccess%20by%20Other%20Users%20Mailbox%20[Nobelium].md)
* [Nobelium campaign DNS pattern](../Command%20and%20Control/DNSPattern%20[Nobelium].md)
* [Nobelium encoded domain in URL](../Command%20and%20Control/EncodedDomainURL%20[Nobelium].md)
* [Domain federation trust settings modified](../Defense%20evasion/ADFSDomainTrustMods[Nobelium].md)
* [Discovering potentially tampered devices [Nobelium]](../Defense%20evasion/Discovering%20potentially%20tampered%20devices%20[Nobelium].md)
* [Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions added to OAuth application](../Defense%20evasion/MailPermissionsAddedToApplication[Nobelium].md)
* [Suspicious enumeration using Adfind tool](../Discovery/SuspiciousEnumerationUsingAdfind[Nobelium].md)
* [Anomalous use of MailItemAccess by GraphAPI [Nobelium]](../Exfiltration/Anomaly%20of%20MailItemAccess%20by%20GraphAPI%20[Nobelium].md)
* [MailItemsAccessed throttling [Nobelium]](../Exfiltration/MailItemsAccessed%20Throttling%20[Nobelium].md)
* [OAuth apps accessing user mail via GraphAPI [Nobelium]](../Exfiltration/OAuth%20Apps%20accessing%20user%20mail%20via%20GraphAPI%20[Nobelium].md)
* [OAuth apps reading mail via GraphAPI and directly [Nobelium]](../Exfiltration/OAuth%20Apps%20reading%20mail%20both%20via%20GraphAPI%20and%20directly%20[Nobelium].md)
* [OAuth apps reading mail via GraphAPI anomaly [Nobelium]](../Exfiltration/OAuth%20Apps%20reading%20mail%20via%20GraphAPI%20anomaly%20[Nobelium].md)
* [Credentials were added to an Azure AD application after 'Admin Consent' permissions granted [Nobelium]](../Persistence/CredentialsAddAfterAdminConsentedToApp[Nobelium].md)
* [New access credential added to application or service principal](../Persistence/NewAppOrServicePrincipalCredential[Nobelium].md)
* [Add uncommon credential type to application [Nobelium]](./Add%20uncommon%20credential%20type%20to%20application%20[Nobelium].md)
## Contributor info
**Contributor:** Dor Edry
**GitHub alias:** doredry
**Organization:** Microsoft 365 Defender
**Contact info:** dor.edry@microsoft.com