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Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled
The following analytic detects the disabling of audit policies on a domain controller. It leverages EventCode 4719 from Windows Security Event Logs to identify changes where success or failure auditing is removed. This activity is significant as it suggests an attacker may have gained access to the domain controller and is attempting to evade detection by tampering with audit policies. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to severe consequences, including data theft, privilege escalation, and full network compromise. Immediate investigation is required to determine the source and intent of the change.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4719 (AuditPolicyChanges IN ("%%8448","%%8450","%%8448, %%8450") OR Changes IN ("Failure removed","Success removed","Success removed, Failure removed")) dest_category="domain_controller"
| replace "%%8448" with "Success removed", "%%8450" with "Failure removed", "%%8448, %%8450" with "Success removed, Failure removed" in AuditPolicyChanges
| eval AuditPolicyChanges=coalesce(AuditPolicyChanges,Changes), SubcategoryGuid=coalesce(SubcategoryGuid,Subcategory_GUID)
| stats min(_time) as _time values(host) as dest
BY AuditPolicyChanges SubcategoryGuid
| lookup advanced_audit_policy_guids GUID as SubcategoryGuid OUTPUT Category SubCategory
| `windows_ad_domain_controller_audit_policy_disabled_filter`Author
Dean Luxton
Created
2026-04-15
Data Sources
Windows Event Log Security 4719
Tags
Windows Audit Policy Tampering
Raw Content
name: Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled
id: fc3ccef1-60a4-4239-bd66-b279511b4d14
version: 10
date: '2026-04-15'
author: Dean Luxton
type: TTP
status: production
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4719
description: The following analytic detects the disabling of audit policies on a domain controller. It leverages EventCode 4719 from Windows Security Event Logs to identify changes where success or failure auditing is removed. This activity is significant as it suggests an attacker may have gained access to the domain controller and is attempting to evade detection by tampering with audit policies. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to severe consequences, including data theft, privilege escalation, and full network compromise. Immediate investigation is required to determine the source and intent of the change.
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4719 (AuditPolicyChanges IN ("%%8448","%%8450","%%8448, %%8450") OR Changes IN ("Failure removed","Success removed","Success removed, Failure removed")) dest_category="domain_controller"
| replace "%%8448" with "Success removed", "%%8450" with "Failure removed", "%%8448, %%8450" with "Success removed, Failure removed" in AuditPolicyChanges
| eval AuditPolicyChanges=coalesce(AuditPolicyChanges,Changes), SubcategoryGuid=coalesce(SubcategoryGuid,Subcategory_GUID)
| stats min(_time) as _time values(host) as dest
BY AuditPolicyChanges SubcategoryGuid
| lookup advanced_audit_policy_guids GUID as SubcategoryGuid OUTPUT Category SubCategory
| `windows_ad_domain_controller_audit_policy_disabled_filter`
how_to_implement: Ensure you are ingesting EventCode `4719` from your domain controllers, the category domain_controller exists in assets and identities, and that assets and identities is enabled. If A&I is not configured, you will need to manually filter the results within the base search.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4719
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
rba:
message: GPO $SubCategory$ of $Category$ was disabled on $dest$
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Audit Policy Tampering
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1562.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
manual_test: This search uses a lookup provided by Enterprise Security and needs to be manually tested
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable_gpo/windows-security-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog