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splunk_escuTTP
Windows Credential Target Information Structure in Commandline
Detects DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication such as in CVE-2025-33073. This detection leverages process creation events looking for specific CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structures.
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process="*1UWhRCA*" Processes.process="*AAAAA*" Processes.process="*YBAAAA*"
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_credential_target_information_structure_in_commandline_filter`Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 1
References
- https://web.archive.org/web/20250617122747/https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
- https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/relaying-kerberos-over-smb-using-krbrelayx
- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/the-birth-and-death-of-loopyticket/
Tags
Compromised Windows HostSuspicious DNS TrafficLocal Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUpKerberos Coercion with DNS
Raw Content
name: Windows Credential Target Information Structure in Commandline
id: f79c5d7a-dd99-4263-93e1-49ace5634c82
version: 3
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: Detects DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication such as in CVE-2025-33073. This detection leverages process creation events looking for specific CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structures.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process="*1UWhRCA*" Processes.process="*AAAAA*" Processes.process="*YBAAAA*"
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_credential_target_information_structure_in_commandline_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Commands with all of these base64 encoded values are unusual in production environments. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20250617122747/https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
- https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/relaying-kerberos-over-smb-using-krbrelayx
- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/the-birth-and-death-of-loopyticket/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: An instance of CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION magic string was identified in a command on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Compromised Windows Host
- Suspicious DNS Traffic
- Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp
- Kerberos Coercion with DNS
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1557.001
- T1187
- T1071.004
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
cve:
- CVE-2025-33073
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1071.004/kerberos_coercion/sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog