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Windows Credential Target Information Structure in Commandline

Detects DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication such as in CVE-2025-33073. This detection leverages process creation events looking for specific CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structures.

MITRE ATT&CK

command-and-control

Detection Query

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE Processes.process="*1UWhRCA*" Processes.process="*AAAAA*" Processes.process="*YBAAAA*"
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_credential_target_information_structure_in_commandline_filter`

Author

Raven Tait, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 1

Tags

Compromised Windows HostSuspicious DNS TrafficLocal Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUpKerberos Coercion with DNS
Raw Content
name: Windows Credential Target Information Structure in Commandline
id: f79c5d7a-dd99-4263-93e1-49ace5634c82
version: 3
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: Detects DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication such as in CVE-2025-33073. This detection leverages process creation events looking for specific CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structures.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE Processes.process="*1UWhRCA*" Processes.process="*AAAAA*" Processes.process="*YBAAAA*"
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_credential_target_information_structure_in_commandline_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Commands with all of these base64 encoded values are unusual in production environments. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20250617122747/https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/relaying-kerberos-over-smb-using-krbrelayx
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/the-birth-and-death-of-loopyticket/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: An instance of CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION magic string was identified in a command on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
    risk_objects:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Compromised Windows Host
        - Suspicious DNS Traffic
        - Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp
        - Kerberos Coercion with DNS
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1557.001
        - T1187
        - T1071.004
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
    cve:
        - CVE-2025-33073
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1071.004/kerberos_coercion/sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog