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splunk_escuAnomaly
Windows Entra User Management Via Azure CLI
This analytic detects the usage of the Azure CLI to interact with user accounts such as creating or deleting a user. Adversaries create new users so that their malicious activity does not interrupt the normal functions of the compromised users and can remain undetected. While legitimate administrative use is expected, anomalous execution patterns, unexpected users, or unusual parent processes should be treated as potential indicators of compromise and investigated promptly.
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process IN (
"*az.cmd*",
"*azure.cli*"
)
Processes.process="*ad *"
Processes.process="* user*"
by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id
Processes.process_hash Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action Processes.dest
Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id
Processes.user Processes.process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_entra_user_management_via_azure_cli_filter`Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
References
Raw Content
name: Windows Entra User Management Via Azure CLI
id: f6332409-abeb-42f8-b6a7-76201bdc7a0a
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-05-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
This analytic detects the usage of the Azure CLI to interact with user accounts such as creating or deleting a user.
Adversaries create new users so that their malicious activity does not interrupt the normal functions of the compromised users and can remain undetected.
While legitimate administrative use is expected, anomalous execution patterns, unexpected users, or unusual parent processes should be treated as potential indicators of compromise and investigated promptly.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process IN (
"*az.cmd*",
"*azure.cli*"
)
Processes.process="*ad *"
Processes.process="* user*"
by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id
Processes.process_hash Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action Processes.dest
Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id
Processes.user Processes.process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_entra_user_management_via_azure_cli_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Legitimate IT administrators commonly use the Azure CLI for managing user accounts. Filter alerts to exclude approved administrative or automated user management activities.
references:
- https://atomicredteam.io/persistence/T1136.003/#atomic-test-3---azure-ad---create-a-new-user-via-azure-cli
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/?view=azure-cli-latest
drilldown_searches:
- earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: Azure user management activity observed on $dest$ executed by $parent_process_name$ via commandline $process$.
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process
type: process
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Persistence
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1136
- T1078.004
- T1098
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136/snapattack/snapattack.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit