Cisco NVM - MSHTML or MSHTA Network Execution Without URL in CLI

name: Cisco NVM - MSHTML or MSHTA Network Execution Without URL in CLI
id: f2a9df84-9b01-4a21-9e3a-7aa1a217f69e
version: 6
creation_date: '2025-07-01'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    This analytic detects suspicious use of 'mshta.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' invoking 'mshtml.dll'
    or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
    This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
    initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
    detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
    like 'GetObject()'.
data_source:
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data
search: |
    `cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`
    (
      (
        process_name = "mshta.exe"
        process_arguments IN ("*javascript*", "*vbscript*")
      )
      OR
      ( process_name = "rundll32.exe" AND
        process_arguments = "*mshtml*" AND
        process_arguments = "*RunHTMLApplication*"
      )
    )
    NOT process_arguments IN ("*http://*", "*https://*")
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
            values(parent_process_arguments) as parent_process_arguments
            values(process_arguments) as process_arguments
            values(parent_process_hash) as parent_process_hash
            values(process_hash) as process_hash
            values(module_name_list) as module_name_list
            values(module_hash_list) as module_hash_list
            values(dest_port) as dest_port
            values(aliul) as additional_logged_in_users_list
            values(dest_hostname) as dest_hostname
            by src dest parent_process_path parent_process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_integrity_level process_id transport
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | table
      parent_process_integrity_level parent_process_path parent_process_arguments parent_process_hash
      process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_arguments process_hash process_id
      additional_logged_in_users_list module_name_list module_hash_list
      src dest_hostname dest dest_port transport firstTime lastTime
    | `cisco_nvm___mshtml_or_mshta_network_execution_without_url_in_cli_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    This search requires Network Visibility Module logs, which includes the flow data sourcetype.
    This search uses an input macro named `cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`.
    We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
    (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Cisco Network Visibility Module logs.
    Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment.
    The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
    The logs are to be ingested using the Splunk Add-on for Cisco Endpoint Security Analytics (CESA) (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4221).
known_false_positives: |
    False positives should be minimal as the presence of a network connection during such executions increases the likelihood of malicious behavior.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/mshta-attack-technique/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/mshtml/nf-mshtml-mshtml_runhtmlapplication
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$src$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  src = "$src$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$src$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$src$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: src
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: The host $src$ executed $process_name$ with potential obfuscated logic and initiated a network connection to $dest_hostname$ / $dest$ over $dest_port$.
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Analytics
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.005
    - T1059.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test - Cisco NVM
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/cisco_network_visibility_module/cisco_nvm_flowdata/nvm_flowdata.log
          source: not_applicable
          sourcetype: cisco:nvm:flowdata
      test_type: unit