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splunk_escuTTP
DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network
The following analytic detects instances of DLLHost.exe running without command line arguments while establishing a network connection. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution and network activity data. It is significant because DLLHost.exe typically runs with specific arguments, and its absence can indicate malicious activity, such as Cobalt Strike usage. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute code, move laterally, or exfiltrate data, posing a severe threat to the network's security.
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
(
Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe
OR
Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe
)
Processes.process IN (
"*dllhost",
"*dllhost.exe",
"*dllhost.exe\""
)
by host _time span=1h
Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| rename dest as src
| join host process_id
[
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count
latest(All_Traffic.dest) as dest
latest(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip
latest(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port
FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where
All_Traffic.dest_port != 0
by host All_Traffic.action All_Traffic.app All_Traffic.bytes All_Traffic.bytes_in
All_Traffic.bytes_out All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port
All_Traffic.dvc All_Traffic.protocol All_Traffic.protocol_version All_Traffic.src
All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.src_port All_Traffic.transport All_Traffic.user
All_Traffic.vendor_product All_Traffic.direction All_Traffic.process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
]
| `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`
Author
Steven Dick, Michael Haag, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 1 AND Sysmon EventID 3
References
Tags
BlackByte RansomwareCobalt StrikeGraceful Wipe Out AttackCactus RansomwareStorm-2460 CLFS Zero Day ExploitationEarth Alux
Raw Content
name: DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network
id: f1c07594-a141-11eb-8407-acde48001122
version: 15
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Steven Dick, Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
The following analytic detects instances of DLLHost.exe running without
command line arguments while establishing a network connection.
This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry,
focusing on process execution and network activity data.
It is significant because DLLHost.exe typically runs with specific arguments,
and its absence can indicate malicious activity, such as Cobalt Strike usage.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute code,
move laterally, or exfiltrate data, posing a severe threat to the network's security.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1 AND Sysmon EventID 3
search: |
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
(
Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe
OR
Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe
)
Processes.process IN (
"*dllhost",
"*dllhost.exe",
"*dllhost.exe\""
)
by host _time span=1h
Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| rename dest as src
| join host process_id
[
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count
latest(All_Traffic.dest) as dest
latest(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip
latest(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port
FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where
All_Traffic.dest_port != 0
by host All_Traffic.action All_Traffic.app All_Traffic.bytes All_Traffic.bytes_in
All_Traffic.bytes_out All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port
All_Traffic.dvc All_Traffic.protocol All_Traffic.protocol_version All_Traffic.src
All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.src_port All_Traffic.transport All_Traffic.user
All_Traffic.vendor_product All_Traffic.direction All_Traffic.process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
]
| `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`
how_to_implement: |
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications
may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive.
references:
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $src$ by $user$.
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: process
- field: process_name
type: process_name
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- Cactus Ransomware
- Storm-2460 CLFS Zero Day Exploitation
- Earth Alux
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1055
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog