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sublimemediumRule
Open redirect: business.google.com website_shared URL Param
Detects messages containing an open redirect in business.google.com's website_shared/launch_bw.html endpoint with the 'f' parameter. This has been exploited in phishing campaigns to redirect users to malicious sites.
Detection Query
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "business.google.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/website_shared/launch_bw.html')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'f=')
// Make sure the redirect is not going back to google.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'f=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*google\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// Exclude legitimate Google domains as senders
and not regex.icontains(sender.email.domain.root_domain, '^google')
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Data Sources
Email MessagesEmail HeadersEmail Attachments
Platforms
email
Raw Content
name: "Open redirect: business.google.com website_shared URL Param"
description: |
Detects messages containing an open redirect in business.google.com's
website_shared/launch_bw.html endpoint with the 'f' parameter. This has been
exploited in phishing campaigns to redirect users to malicious sites.
type: "rule"
severity: "medium"
source: |
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.domain == "business.google.com"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/website_shared/launch_bw.html')
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'f=')
// Make sure the redirect is not going back to google.com
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'f=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*google\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
// Exclude legitimate Google domains as senders
and not regex.icontains(sender.email.domain.root_domain, '^google')
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
attack_types:
- "Credential Phishing"
- "Malware/Ransomware"
tactics_and_techniques:
- "Open redirect"
detection_methods:
- "Sender analysis"
- "URL analysis"
id: "f146be73-7200-570e-a033-a28814c5a098"