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sublimehighRule

Credential phishing: Email delivery failure impersonation

Detects phishing emails impersonating email system notifications claiming delivery failures, rejected messages, or email system issues requiring user action to 'fix' or 'recover' email functionality. These attacks typically claim incoming emails couldn't be delivered and direct users to malicious portals to harvest credentials.

MITRE ATT&CK

initial-access

Detection Query

type.inbound
and length(body.links) < 10
and (
  any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
      .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence == "high"
  )
  or (
    length(body.current_thread.text) < 250
    and any(recipients.to,
            strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, .email.domain.sld)
            or strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, .email.local_part)
    )
  )
)
and (
  regex.icontains(subject.subject, '(e)?mail(s)?')
  or (
    length(body.current_thread.text) < 700
    and strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, '*mail*')
  )
)
and 3 of (
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*incoming messages*"),
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*server error*"),
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*blocked*"),
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*prevented*"),
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*notification*"),
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*fix email issues*"),
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*rejected*"),
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*recover and prevent*"),
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*failure*"),
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*rejection*"),
  strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*failed*")
)
and (
  any(body.links,
      regex.icontains(.display_text,
                      "view",
                      "messages",
                      "recover",
                      "fix",
                      "portal",
                      "connect"
      )
      and not .display_text == "View Report"
      and .href_url.domain.root_domain in ("gmass.co")
  )
  or (
    length(body.links) < 3
    and any(body.links,
            any(recipients.to,
                .email.domain.root_domain == ..display_url.domain.root_domain
                and ..mismatched
            )
    )
  )
  or (all(recipients.to, .email.local_part == sender.display_name))
  or any(body.links,
         any(.href_url.rewrite.encoders, . == "proofpoint")
         and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $tranco_50k
         and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
  )
)
and not any(body.links,
            regex.icontains(.display_text,
                            "view document",
                            "review (&|and) sign document"
            )
)
and sender.email.domain.root_domain not in (
  "bing.com",
  "microsoft.com",
  "microsoftonline.com",
  "microsoftsupport.com",
  "microsoft365.com",
  "office.com",
  "office365.com",
  "onedrive.com",
  "sharepointonline.com",
  "yammer.com",
  "ppops.net"
)

// negate org domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains
    and (
      not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
      // MS  emails from an org domain are router "internally" to MS, therefore, there is no authentication information
      or not (
        headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass is null
        and all(headers.domains,
                .root_domain in ("outlook.com", "office365.com")
        )
        // typical emails from freemail Outlook accounts are from prod.outlook.com
        and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, "protection.outlook.com>")
      )
    )
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
)

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
and not profile.by_sender().solicited
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign

Data Sources

Email MessagesEmail HeadersEmail Attachments

Platforms

email
Raw Content
name: "Credential phishing: Email delivery failure impersonation"
description: |
  Detects phishing emails impersonating email system notifications claiming delivery failures, 
  rejected messages, or email system issues requiring user action to 'fix' or 'recover' email functionality.
  These attacks typically claim incoming emails couldn't be delivered and direct users to malicious 
  portals to harvest credentials.
type: "rule"
severity: "high"
source: |
  type.inbound
  and length(body.links) < 10
  and (
    any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
        .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence == "high"
    )
    or (
      length(body.current_thread.text) < 250
      and any(recipients.to,
              strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, .email.domain.sld)
              or strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, .email.local_part)
      )
    )
  )
  and (
    regex.icontains(subject.subject, '(e)?mail(s)?')
    or (
      length(body.current_thread.text) < 700
      and strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, '*mail*')
    )
  )
  and 3 of (
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*incoming messages*"),
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*server error*"),
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*blocked*"),
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*prevented*"),
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*notification*"),
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*fix email issues*"),
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*rejected*"),
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*recover and prevent*"),
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*failure*"),
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*rejection*"),
    strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*failed*")
  )
  and (
    any(body.links,
        regex.icontains(.display_text,
                        "view",
                        "messages",
                        "recover",
                        "fix",
                        "portal",
                        "connect"
        )
        and not .display_text == "View Report"
        and .href_url.domain.root_domain in ("gmass.co")
    )
    or (
      length(body.links) < 3
      and any(body.links,
              any(recipients.to,
                  .email.domain.root_domain == ..display_url.domain.root_domain
                  and ..mismatched
              )
      )
    )
    or (all(recipients.to, .email.local_part == sender.display_name))
    or any(body.links,
           any(.href_url.rewrite.encoders, . == "proofpoint")
           and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $tranco_50k
           and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
    )
  )
  and not any(body.links,
              regex.icontains(.display_text,
                              "view document",
                              "review (&|and) sign document"
              )
  )
  and sender.email.domain.root_domain not in (
    "bing.com",
    "microsoft.com",
    "microsoftonline.com",
    "microsoftsupport.com",
    "microsoft365.com",
    "office.com",
    "office365.com",
    "onedrive.com",
    "sharepointonline.com",
    "yammer.com",
    "ppops.net"
  )
  
  // negate org domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
  and (
    (
      sender.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains
      and (
        not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
        // MS  emails from an org domain are router "internally" to MS, therefore, there is no authentication information
        or not (
          headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass is null
          and all(headers.domains,
                  .root_domain in ("outlook.com", "office365.com")
          )
          // typical emails from freemail Outlook accounts are from prod.outlook.com
          and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, "protection.outlook.com>")
        )
      )
    )
    or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
  )
  
  // negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
  and (
    (
      sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
      and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
    )
    or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
  )
  and not profile.by_sender().solicited
  and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
  
attack_types:
  - "Credential Phishing"
tactics_and_techniques:
  - "Impersonation: Brand"
  - "Social engineering"
detection_methods:
  - "Content analysis"
  - "Natural Language Understanding"
  - "Sender analysis"
id: "ee318b89-0d4e-5c94-80ad-08991d3958b2"