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sublimemediumRule
Open redirect: listing.ca
Message contains use of the listing.ca redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Detection Query
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "listing.ca"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'goto=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'goto=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*listing\.ca(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "listing.ca"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Data Sources
Email MessagesEmail HeadersEmail Attachments
Platforms
email
Raw Content
name: "Open redirect: listing.ca"
description: |
Message contains use of the listing.ca redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
type: "rule"
severity: "medium"
source: |
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "listing.ca"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'goto=')
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'goto=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*listing\.ca(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
)
)
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "listing.ca"
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
attack_types:
- "Credential Phishing"
- "Malware/Ransomware"
tactics_and_techniques:
- "Open redirect"
detection_methods:
- "Sender analysis"
- "URL analysis"
id: "e90871fe-cc9d-59e8-8057-93c4a3f785be"