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sublimemediumRule
Suspicious newly registered reply-to domain with engaging financial or urgent language
Detects messages from a mismatched newly registered Reply-to domain that contain a financial or urgent request, or a request and an NLU tag with medium to high confidence, from an untrusted sender. This technique is typically observed in Vendor impersonation.
Detection Query
type.inbound
and length(body.current_thread.text) < 5000
and any(headers.reply_to,
// mismatched reply-to and sender domain
.email.domain.root_domain != sender.email.domain.root_domain
// newly registered reply-to domain
and network.whois(.email.domain).days_old <= 30
)
// request is being made
and any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
.name == "request"
)
// there's financial/urgency OR a tag of medium/high confidence
and (
any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
.name in ("financial", "urgency")
)
or any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).tags,
.name is not null and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
)
)
and (
not profile.by_sender().solicited
//
// This rule makes use of a beta feature and is subject to change without notice
// using the beta feature in custom rules is not suggested until it has been formally released
//
or not beta.profile.by_reply_to().solicited
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Data Sources
Email MessagesEmail HeadersEmail Attachments
Platforms
email
Raw Content
name: "Suspicious newly registered reply-to domain with engaging financial or urgent language"
description: |
Detects messages from a mismatched newly registered Reply-to domain that contain a financial or urgent request, or a request and
an NLU tag with medium to high confidence, from an untrusted sender. This technique is typically observed in Vendor impersonation.
type: "rule"
severity: "medium"
source: |
type.inbound
and length(body.current_thread.text) < 5000
and any(headers.reply_to,
// mismatched reply-to and sender domain
.email.domain.root_domain != sender.email.domain.root_domain
// newly registered reply-to domain
and network.whois(.email.domain).days_old <= 30
)
// request is being made
and any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
.name == "request"
)
// there's financial/urgency OR a tag of medium/high confidence
and (
any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
.name in ("financial", "urgency")
)
or any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).tags,
.name is not null and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
)
)
and (
not profile.by_sender().solicited
//
// This rule makes use of a beta feature and is subject to change without notice
// using the beta feature in custom rules is not suggested until it has been formally released
//
or not beta.profile.by_reply_to().solicited
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
attack_types:
- "BEC/Fraud"
tactics_and_techniques:
- "Social engineering"
detection_methods:
- "Content analysis"
- "Header analysis"
- "Natural Language Understanding"
- "Sender analysis"
- "URL analysis"
- "Whois"
id: "db4d9bb3-0eca-5525-9a99-7c1c773b580f"