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splunk_escuAnomaly

Windows Chrome Enable Extension Loading via Command-Line

The following analytic detects instances where Google Chrome is started with the --disable-features=DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch flag, effectively enabling the loading of extensions via the command line. This may indicate attempts to bypass enterprise extension policies, load unauthorized or malicious extensions, or manipulate browser behavior. Monitoring this activity helps identify potential security policy violations, malware persistence techniques, or other suspicious Chrome modifications.

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection Query

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
  Processes.process_name = "Chrome.exe"
  Processes.process= "*--disable-features*"
  Processes.process= "*DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch*"
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
   Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_chrome_enable_extension_loading_via_command_line_filter`

Author

Teoderick Contreras, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2

Tags

Browser Hijacking
Raw Content
name: Windows Chrome Enable Extension Loading via Command-Line
id: da355155-1d23-48f9-bf95-e534ae273ab0
version: 2
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    The following analytic detects instances where Google Chrome is started with the --disable-features=DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch flag, effectively enabling the loading of extensions via the command line.
    This may indicate attempts to bypass enterprise extension policies, load unauthorized or malicious extensions, or manipulate browser behavior.
    Monitoring this activity helps identify potential security policy violations, malware persistence techniques, or other suspicious Chrome modifications.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
      Processes.process_name = "Chrome.exe"
      Processes.process= "*--disable-features*"
      Processes.process= "*DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch*"
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
       Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_chrome_enable_extension_loading_via_command_line_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
known_false_positives: Developers or IT admins loading unpacked extensions for testing or deployment purposes.
references:
    - https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2025/11/38298-learning-about-browser-hijacking
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A $process_name$ process attempted to enable browser extension loading via command line $process$ on $dest$.
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
    threat_objects:
        - field: parent_process_name
          type: parent_process_name
        - field: process_name
          type: process_name
        - field: process
          type: process
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Browser Hijacking
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1185
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1185/chrome_load_extensions/chrome_load_extension.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog