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splunk_escuAnomaly
Windows Chrome Enable Extension Loading via Command-Line
The following analytic detects instances where Google Chrome is started with the --disable-features=DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch flag, effectively enabling the loading of extensions via the command line. This may indicate attempts to bypass enterprise extension policies, load unauthorized or malicious extensions, or manipulate browser behavior. Monitoring this activity helps identify potential security policy violations, malware persistence techniques, or other suspicious Chrome modifications.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process_name = "Chrome.exe"
Processes.process= "*--disable-features*"
Processes.process= "*DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch*"
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_chrome_enable_extension_loading_via_command_line_filter`
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
Tags
Browser Hijacking
Raw Content
name: Windows Chrome Enable Extension Loading via Command-Line
id: da355155-1d23-48f9-bf95-e534ae273ab0
version: 2
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
The following analytic detects instances where Google Chrome is started with the --disable-features=DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch flag, effectively enabling the loading of extensions via the command line.
This may indicate attempts to bypass enterprise extension policies, load unauthorized or malicious extensions, or manipulate browser behavior.
Monitoring this activity helps identify potential security policy violations, malware persistence techniques, or other suspicious Chrome modifications.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process_name = "Chrome.exe"
Processes.process= "*--disable-features*"
Processes.process= "*DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch*"
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_chrome_enable_extension_loading_via_command_line_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
known_false_positives: Developers or IT admins loading unpacked extensions for testing or deployment purposes.
references:
- https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2025/11/38298-learning-about-browser-hijacking
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: A $process_name$ process attempted to enable browser extension loading via command line $process$ on $dest$.
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process_name
type: process_name
- field: process
type: process
tags:
analytic_story:
- Browser Hijacking
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1185
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1185/chrome_load_extensions/chrome_load_extension.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog