← Back to Explore
splunk_escuHunting
Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request
The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. It leverages Event ID 4781 (account name change) and Event ID 4768 (TGT request) to identify sequences where a newly renamed computer account requests a TGT. This behavior is significant as it could represent an attempt to escalate privileges by impersonating a Domain Controller. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain elevated access and potentially control over the domain environment.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 OldTargetUserName="*$" NewTargetUserName!="*$") OR (EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!="*$")
| eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(NewTargetUserName, TargetUserName)
| transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768)
| eval short_lived=case((duration<2),"TRUE")
| search short_lived = TRUE
| table _time, Computer, EventCode, TargetUserName, RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived
| rename Computer as dest
| `suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`Author
Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Created
2026-02-25
Data Sources
Windows Event Log Security 4768Windows Event Log Security 4781
References
Tags
sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller ImpersonationActive Directory Kerberos AttacksActive Directory Privilege Escalation
Raw Content
name: Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request
id: d77d349e-6269-11ec-9cfe-acde48001122
version: 9
date: '2026-02-25'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. It leverages Event ID 4781 (account name change) and Event ID 4768 (TGT request) to identify sequences where a newly renamed computer account requests a TGT. This behavior is significant as it could represent an attempt to escalate privileges by impersonating a Domain Controller. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain elevated access and potentially control over the domain environment.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4768
- Windows Event Log Security 4781
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 OldTargetUserName="*$" NewTargetUserName!="*$") OR (EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!="*$")
| eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(NewTargetUserName, TargetUserName)
| transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768)
| eval short_lived=case((duration<2),"TRUE")
| search short_lived = TRUE
| table _time, Computer, EventCode, TargetUserName, RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived
| rename Computer as dest
| `suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287
tags:
analytic_story:
- sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation
- Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
- Active Directory Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1078.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request/windows-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog