splunk_escuTTP

Windows Short Lived DNS Record

The following analytic identifies the creation and quick deletion of a DNS object within 300 seconds in an Active Directory environment, indicative of a potential attack abusing DNS. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5136 and 5137, analyzing the duration between these events. This activity is significant as temporary DNS entries allows attackers to cause unexpecting network trafficking, leading to potential compromise.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1071.004 T1557.001 T1187

command-and-control

Detection Query

`wineventlog_security` ((EventCode=5137  ObjectClass="dnsNode") OR (EventCode=5136 ObjectClass="dnsNode" AttributeLDAPDisplayName="dNSTombstoned" AttributeValue="TRUE"))
  | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode) as event_codes values(ObjectDN) as dns_record values(SubjectUserName) as user values(Computer) as dest
    BY ObjectGUID
  | where mvcount(event_codes)=2
  | eval time_diff=lastTime - firstTime
  | where time_diff <= 300
  | table firstTime, lastTime, dns_record, user, dest, time_diff, ObjectGUID
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
  | `windows_short_lived_dns_record_filter`

Author

Raven Tait, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Windows Event Log Security 5136Windows Event Log Security 5137

References

Tags

Compromised Windows HostSuspicious DNS TrafficLocal Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUpKerberos Coercion with DNS

Raw Content

name: Windows Short Lived DNS Record
id: d585e253-1859-4170-977d-09376c731f74
version: 3
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the creation and quick deletion of a DNS object within 300 seconds in an Active Directory environment, indicative of a potential attack abusing DNS. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5136 and 5137, analyzing the duration between these events. This activity is significant as temporary DNS entries allows attackers to cause unexpecting network trafficking, leading to potential compromise.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 5136
    - Windows Event Log Security 5137
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` ((EventCode=5137  ObjectClass="dnsNode") OR (EventCode=5136 ObjectClass="dnsNode" AttributeLDAPDisplayName="dNSTombstoned" AttributeValue="TRUE"))
      | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode) as event_codes values(ObjectDN) as dns_record values(SubjectUserName) as user values(Computer) as dest
        BY ObjectGUID
      | where mvcount(event_codes)=2
      | eval time_diff=lastTime - firstTime
      | where time_diff <= 300
      | table firstTime, lastTime, dns_record, user, dest, time_diff, ObjectGUID
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_short_lived_dns_record_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you ned to be ingesting Event codes `5136` and `5137`. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Directory Services Changes` within `DS Access` needs to be enabled. For these event codes to be generated, specific SACLs are required.
known_false_positives: Creating and deleting a DNS server object within 30 seconds or less is unusual but not impossible in a production environment. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20250617122747/https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/relaying-kerberos-over-smb-using-krbrelayx
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/the-birth-and-death-of-loopyticket/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  Computer = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A short-lived DNS object was created and deleted on $dest$
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Compromised Windows Host
        - Suspicious DNS Traffic
        - Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp
        - Kerberos Coercion with DNS
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1071.004
        - T1557.001
        - T1187
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
    cve:
        - CVE-2025-33073
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1071.004/kerberos_coercion/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog