splunk_escuHunting

Esentutl SAM Copy

The following analytic detects the use of `esentutl.exe` to access credentials stored in the ntds.dit or SAM file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive credential information, which is a common tactic in lateral movement and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to user credentials, potentially compromising the entire network.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1003.002

credential-access

Detection Query

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)
Processes.process IN ("*ntds*", "*SAM*")
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`

Author

Michael Haag, Splunk

Created

2025-12-15

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2

References

Tags

Credential DumpingLiving Off The Land

Raw Content

name: Esentutl SAM Copy
id: d372f928-ce4f-11eb-a762-acde48001122
version: 9
date: '2025-12-15'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects the use of `esentutl.exe` to access credentials stored in the ntds.dit or SAM file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive credential information, which is a common tactic in lateral movement and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to user credentials, potentially compromising the entire network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
    as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    (Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)
    Processes.process IN ("*ntds*", "*SAM*")
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
       Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
       Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/6a570c2a4630cf0c2bd41a2e8375b5d5ab92f700/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md
    - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404/
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Credential Dumping
        - Living Off The Land
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1003.002
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog