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sigmamediumHunting
Regsvr32.EXE Calling of DllRegisterServer Export Function Implicitly
Detects execution of regsvr32 with the silent flag and no other flags on a DLL located in an uncommon or potentially suspicious location. When Regsvr32 is called in such a way, it implicitly calls the DLL export function 'DllRegisterServer'.
Detection Query
selection_image:
- Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe
- OriginalFileName: REGSVR32.EXE
selection_cmdline:
CommandLine|contains:
- " /s "
- " /e "
filter_main_paths:
- CommandLine|contains:
- :\Program Files (x86)
- :\Program Files\
- :\Windows\System32\
- :\Windows\SysWOW64\
- CurrentDirectory|contains:
- :\Program Files (x86)
- :\Program Files\
- :\Windows\System32\
- :\Windows\SysWOW64\
filter_main_other_flags:
CommandLine|contains:
- " /i:"
- "/U "
filter_main_rpcproxy:
ParentCommandLine|endswith: :\Windows\System32\RpcProxy\RpcProxy.dll
CommandLine: regsvr32 /s rpcproxy.dll
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
Author
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Created
2023-10-17
Data Sources
windowsProcess Creation Events
Platforms
windows
References
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/288fc4f954f98d724e6fab32a89477943df5c0e9662cb199a19b90ae0c63aebe/detection
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/olectl/nf-olectl-dllregisterserver
- https://ss64.com/nt/regsvr32.html
Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.t1218detection.threat-hunting
Raw Content
title: Regsvr32.EXE Calling of DllRegisterServer Export Function Implicitly
id: ce2c44b5-a6ac-412a-afba-9e89326fa972
related:
- id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects execution of regsvr32 with the silent flag and no other flags on a DLL located in an uncommon or potentially suspicious location.
When Regsvr32 is called in such a way, it implicitly calls the DLL export function 'DllRegisterServer'.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/288fc4f954f98d724e6fab32a89477943df5c0e9662cb199a19b90ae0c63aebe/detection
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/olectl/nf-olectl-dllregisterserver
- https://ss64.com/nt/regsvr32.html
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-17
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1218
- detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_image:
- Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'REGSVR32.EXE'
selection_cmdline:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' /s '
- ' /e '
filter_main_paths:
- CommandLine|contains:
- ':\Program Files (x86)'
- ':\Program Files\'
- ':\Windows\System32\'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- CurrentDirectory|contains:
- ':\Program Files (x86)'
- ':\Program Files\'
- ':\Windows\System32\'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
filter_main_other_flags:
# Note: We filter other flags to keep the logic of the rule
CommandLine|contains:
- ' /i:'
- '/U '
filter_main_rpcproxy:
ParentCommandLine|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\RpcProxy\RpcProxy.dll'
CommandLine: 'regsvr32 /s rpcproxy.dll'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage as part of application installation, but less likely from e.g. temporary paths.
level: medium