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Suspicious Eventlog Clearing or Configuration Change Activity

Detects the clearing or configuration tampering of EventLog using utilities such as "wevtutil", "powershell" and "wmic". This technique were seen used by threat actors and ransomware strains in order to evade defenses.

MITRE ATT&CK

defense-evasion

Detection Query

selection_wevtutil_img:
  - Image|endswith: \wevtutil.exe
  - OriginalFileName: wevtutil.exe
selection_wevtutil_cmd:
  CommandLine|contains:
    - "clear-log "
    - " cl "
    - "set-log "
    - " sl "
    - "lfn:"
selection_other_ps_img:
  Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \powershell_ise.exe
    - \pwsh.exe
selection_other_ps_cmd:
  - CommandLine|contains:
      - "Clear-EventLog "
      - "Remove-EventLog "
      - "Limit-EventLog "
      - "Clear-WinEvent "
  - CommandLine|contains|all:
      - Eventing.Reader.EventLogSession
      - ClearLog
  - CommandLine|contains|all:
      - Diagnostics.EventLog
      - Clear
selection_other_wmi:
  Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \powershell_ise.exe
    - \pwsh.exe
    - \wmic.exe
  CommandLine|contains: ClearEventLog
filter_main_msiexec:
  ParentImage:
    - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe
    - C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe
  CommandLine|contains: " sl "
condition: (all of selection_wevtutil_*) or (all of selection_other_ps_*) or
  (selection_other_wmi) and not 1 of filter_main_*

Author

Ecco, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, D3F7A5105, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)

Created

2019-09-26

Data Sources

windowsProcess Creation Events

Platforms

windows

Tags

attack.defense-evasionattack.t1070.001attack.t1562.002car.2016-04-002
Raw Content
title: Suspicious Eventlog Clearing or Configuration Change Activity
id: cc36992a-4671-4f21-a91d-6c2b72a2edf5
status: stable
description: |
    Detects the clearing or configuration tampering of EventLog using utilities such as "wevtutil", "powershell" and "wmic".
    This technique were seen used by threat actors and ransomware strains in order to evade defenses.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/5b223758-07d6-4100-9e11-238cfdd0fe97.html
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
    - https://gist.github.com/fovtran/ac0624983c7722e80a8f5a4babb170ee
    - https://jdhnet.wordpress.com/2017/12/19/changing-the-location-of-the-windows-event-logs/
    - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/huntress-labs_when-a-sketchy-incident-hits-your-network-activity-7304940371078238208-Th_l/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAJTlRcB28IaUtg03HUU-IdliwzoAL1flGc
    - https://stackoverflow.com/questions/66011412/how-to-clear-a-event-log-in-powershell-7
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.diagnostics.eventing.reader.eventlogsession.clearlog?view=windowsdesktop-9.0&viewFallbackFrom=dotnet-plat-ext-5.0#System_Diagnostics_Eventing_Reader_EventLogSession_ClearLog_System_String_
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear
author: Ecco, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, D3F7A5105, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-09-26
modified: 2025-03-12
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1070.001
    - attack.t1562.002
    - car.2016-04-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_wevtutil_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wevtutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wevtutil.exe'
    selection_wevtutil_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'clear-log '          # clears specified log
            - ' cl '                # short version of 'clear-log'
            - 'set-log '            # modifies config of specified log. could be uset to set it to a tiny size
            - ' sl '                # short version of 'set-log'
            - 'lfn:'                # change log file location and name
    selection_other_ps_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_other_ps_cmd:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'Clear-EventLog '
              - 'Remove-EventLog '
              - 'Limit-EventLog '
              - 'Clear-WinEvent '
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'Eventing.Reader.EventLogSession' # [System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventLogSession]::GlobalSession.ClearLog($_.LogName)
              - 'ClearLog'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'Diagnostics.EventLog'
              - 'Clear'
    selection_other_wmi:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'ClearEventLog'
    filter_main_msiexec:
        # Example seen during office update/installation:
        #   ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe
        #   CommandLine: "C:\WINDOWS\system32\wevtutil.exe" sl Microsoft-RMS-MSIPC/Debug /q:true /e:true /l:4 /rt:false
        ParentImage:
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' sl '
    condition: (all of selection_wevtutil_*) or (all of selection_other_ps_*) or (selection_other_wmi) and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Admin activity
    - Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
    - Maintenance activity
level: high