Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn

name: Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn
id: cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af
version: 14
date: '2026-03-26'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprvse.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe.
    It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions.
    This activity is significant as it could indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries.
    If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
    count min(_time) as firstTime
          max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

    (
        Processes.parent_process_name IN (
            "mmc.exe",
            "services.exe",
            "wmiprvse.exe",
            "wsmprovhost.exe"
        )
        OR
        (
            Processes.parent_process_name="svchost.exe"
            ```
            We exclude the "Schedule" service from the svchost.exe process. But since there are instances where its not hosted in a dedicated svchost process, we need to the hosting group "netsvcs" too
            ```
            NOT Processes.parent_process IN (
                "*-k netsvcs*",
                "*-s Schedule*",
            )
        )
    )
    AND
    (
        Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
        OR
        (
            Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
            Processes.process IN (
                "*powershell*",
                "*pwsh*"
            )
        )
    )
    NOT Processes.process IN ("*C:\\Windows\\CCM\\*")

    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    False positives are expected from legitimate use of WMI or certain services. Apply additoinal filters as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
    threat_objects:
        - field: parent_process_name
          type: parent_process_name
        - field: process_name
          type: process_name
        - field: process
          type: process
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Active Directory Lateral Movement
        - Malicious PowerShell
        - Hermetic Wiper
        - Data Destruction
        - Scheduled Tasks
        - CISA AA24-241A
        - Microsoft WSUS CVE-2025-59287
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1021.003
        - T1021.006
        - T1047
        - T1053.005
        - T1059.001
        - T1218.014
        - T1543.003
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog