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Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process

The following analytic detects when a process with low, medium, or high integrity spawns a system integrity process from a user-controlled location. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts where attackers elevate their privileges to SYSTEM level from a user-controlled process or service. The detection leverages Sysmon data, specifically Event ID 15, to identify such transitions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify an attacker gaining SYSTEM-level access, potentially leading to full control over the affected system, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and further malicious activities.

MITRE ATT&CK

privilege-escalationdefense-evasion

Detection Query

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

Processes.process_integrity_level IN (
    "low",
    "medium",
    "high"
)
Processes.process_path IN (
    "*\\\\*",
    "*\\ProgramData\\*",
    "*\\Temp\\*",
    "*\\Users\\*"
)
NOT Processes.user IN (
    "*SYSTEM",
    "*LOCAL SERVICE",
    "*NETWORK SERVICE",
    "DWM-*",
    "*$"
)

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
   Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| eval join_guid = process_guid

| join max=0 dest join_guid [

        | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
          count max(_time) as lastTime

        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

        Processes.process_integrity_level="system"
        Processes.parent_process_path IN (
            "*\\\\*",
            "*\\ProgramData\\*",
            "*\\Temp\\*",
            "*\\Users\\*"
        )

        by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_guid
           Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path
           Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_current_directory

        | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
        | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid, process* as system_process*, user as system_user
    ]
| fields dest user parent_process parent_process_name parent_process_guid
         process process_name process_guid process_integrity_level process_path
         process_current_directory system_process_name system_process system_process_path
         system_process_integrity_level system_process_current_directory system_user
         firstTime lastTime count

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_privilege_escalation_user_process_spawn_system_process_filter`

Author

Steven Dick

Created

2026-03-24

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 1 AND Sysmon EventID 1

Tags

Windows Privilege EscalationCompromised Windows HostBlackSuit RansomwareGhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
Raw Content
name: Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process
id: c9687a28-39ad-43c6-8bcf-eaf061ba0cbe
version: 11
date: '2026-03-24'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects when a process with low, medium, or high integrity spawns a system integrity process from a user-controlled location.
    This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts where attackers elevate their privileges to SYSTEM level from a user-controlled process or service.
    The detection leverages Sysmon data, specifically Event ID 15, to identify such transitions.
    Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify an attacker gaining SYSTEM-level access, potentially leading to full control over the affected system, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and further malicious activities.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1 AND Sysmon EventID 1
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime

    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

    Processes.process_integrity_level IN (
        "low",
        "medium",
        "high"
    )
    Processes.process_path IN (
        "*\\\\*",
        "*\\ProgramData\\*",
        "*\\Temp\\*",
        "*\\Users\\*"
    )
    NOT Processes.user IN (
        "*SYSTEM",
        "*LOCAL SERVICE",
        "*NETWORK SERVICE",
        "DWM-*",
        "*$"
    )

    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | eval join_guid = process_guid

    | join max=0 dest join_guid [

            | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
              count max(_time) as lastTime

            from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

            Processes.process_integrity_level="system"
            Processes.parent_process_path IN (
                "*\\\\*",
                "*\\ProgramData\\*",
                "*\\Temp\\*",
                "*\\Users\\*"
            )

            by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_guid
               Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path
               Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_current_directory

            | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
            | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid, process* as system_process*, user as system_user
        ]
    | fields dest user parent_process parent_process_name parent_process_guid
             process process_name process_guid process_integrity_level process_path
             process_current_directory system_process_name system_process system_process_path
             system_process_integrity_level system_process_current_directory system_user
             firstTime lastTime count

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_privilege_escalation_user_process_spawn_system_process_filter`
how_to_implement: Target environment must ingest sysmon data, specifically Event ID 15.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
    - https://vuls.cert.org/confluence/display/Wiki/2021/06/21/Finding+Privilege+Escalation+Vulnerabilities+in+Windows+using+Process+Monitor
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/getsystem-offsec/
    - https://atomicredteam.io/privilege-escalation/T1134.001/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: The user $user$ launched the process $process_name$ which spawned a system level integrity process.
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
    threat_objects:
        - field: process_name
          type: process_name
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Windows Privilege Escalation
        - Compromised Windows Host
        - BlackSuit Ransomware
        - GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1068
        - T1548
        - T1134
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/windows_escalation_behavior/windows_escalation_behavior_sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      name: True Positive Test