splunk_escuTTP

Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery

The following analytic detects the use of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet with parameters indicating a search for Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify high-value targets for further exploitation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1018

Detection Query

`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-ADComputer*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*TrustedForDelegation*")
  | fillnull
  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest signature signature_id
       user_id vendor_product EventID
       Guid Opcode Name
       Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
       ScriptBlockText
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
  | `windows_get_adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter`

Author

Mauricio Velazco, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Powershell Script Block Logging 4104

References

Tags

Medusa RansomwareActive Directory Kerberos Attacks

Raw Content

name: Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery
id: c8640777-469f-4638-ab44-c34a3233ffac
version: 10
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet with parameters indicating a search for Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify high-value targets for further exploitation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-ADComputer*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*TrustedForDelegation*")
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest signature signature_id
           user_id vendor_product EventID
           Guid Opcode Name
           Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
           ScriptBlockText
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_get_adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter`
how_to_implement: The following  analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1667
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/cas-isp-unconstrained-kerberos
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-unrestricted-kerberos-delegation
    - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/weakness-within-kerberos-delegation
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user_id$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user_id = "$user_id$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user_id$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user_id$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: Suspicious PowerShell Get-ADComputer was identified on endpoint $dest$
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
        - field: user_id
          type: user
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Medusa Ransomware
        - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1018
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/windows_get_adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog