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Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity

The following analytic identifies unauthorized replication RPC calls from non-domain controller devices. It leverages Zeek wire data to detect specific RPC operations like DrsReplicaAdd and DRSGetNCChanges, filtering out legitimate domain controllers. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to introduce a rogue domain controller, which can compromise the integrity of the Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to manipulate directory data, escalate privileges, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection Query

`zeek_rpc` DrsReplicaAdd OR DRSGetNCChanges
  | where NOT (dest_category="Domain Controller") OR NOT (src_category="Domain Controller")
  | fillnull value="Unknown" src_category, dest_category
  | table _time endpoint operation src src_category dest dest_category
  | `windows_ad_rogue_domain_controller_network_activity_filter`

Author

Dean Luxton

Created

2026-03-10

Tags

Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
Raw Content
name: Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity
id: c4aeeeef-da7f-4338-b3ba-553cbcbe2138
version: 8
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Dean Luxton
type: TTP
status: experimental
data_source: []
description: The following analytic identifies unauthorized replication RPC calls from non-domain controller devices. It leverages Zeek wire data to detect specific RPC operations like DrsReplicaAdd and DRSGetNCChanges, filtering out legitimate domain controllers. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to introduce a rogue domain controller, which can compromise the integrity of the Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to manipulate directory data, escalate privileges, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.
search: |-
    `zeek_rpc` DrsReplicaAdd OR DRSGetNCChanges
      | where NOT (dest_category="Domain Controller") OR NOT (src_category="Domain Controller")
      | fillnull value="Unknown" src_category, dest_category
      | table _time endpoint operation src src_category dest dest_category
      | `windows_ad_rogue_domain_controller_network_activity_filter`
how_to_implement: Run zeek on domain controllers to capture the DCE RPC calls, ensure the domain controller categories are defined in Assets and Identities.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
rba:
    message: Rogue DC Activity Detected from $src_category$ device $src$ to $dest$ ($dest_category$)
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
    threat_objects:
        - field: src
          type: ip_address
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1207
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: network