Windows Scheduled Task DLL Module Loaded

name: Windows Scheduled Task DLL Module Loaded
id: bc5b2304-f241-419b-874a-e927f667b7b6
version: 7
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 7
type: TTP
status: production
description: The following analytic detects instances where the taskschd.dll is loaded by processes running in suspicious or writable directories. This activity is unusual, as legitimate processes that load taskschd.dll typically reside in protected system locations. Malware or threat actors may attempt to load this DLL from writable or non-standard directories to manipulate the Task Scheduler and execute malicious tasks. By identifying processes that load taskschd.dll in these unsafe locations, this detection helps security analysts flag potentially malicious activity and investigate further to prevent unauthorized system modifications.
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image IN ("*\\windows\\fonts\\*", "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\windows\\debug\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*", "*\\Users\\Default\\*", "*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Windows\\Media\\*", "\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\PerfLogs\\*") ImageLoaded = "*\\taskschd.dll" | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_dll_module_loaded_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Third party Legitimate application may load this task schedule dll module.
references:
    - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/chinese-malware-appears-earnest-across-cybercrime-threat-landscape
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/valleyrat-campaign-targeting-chinese-speakers
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A taskschd.dll was loaded by a process - [$Image$] on [$dest$]
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - ValleyRAT
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1053
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053/taskschd_dll/taskschd_dll.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog