EXPLORE
← Back to Explore
sigmahighHunting

Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry

Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".

MITRE ATT&CK

privilege-escalationpersistencedefense-evasion

Detection Query

selection_key_1:
  TargetObject|contains: \SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\
  TargetObject|endswith: \CustomSD
selection_key_2:
  TargetObject|contains:
    - \Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\
    - \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels
  TargetObject|endswith: \ChannelAccess
selection_details:
  - Details|contains: D:(D;
  - Details|contains|all:
      - D:(
      - )(D;
filter_main_trustedinstaller:
  Image: C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
filter_main_tiworker:
  Image|startswith: C:\Windows\WinSxS\
  Image|endswith: \TiWorker.exe
filter_optional_empty:
  Image: ""
filter_optional_null:
  Image: null
condition: 1 of selection_key_* and selection_details and not 1 of filter_main_*
  and not 1 of filter_optional_*

Author

X__Junior

Created

2025-01-16

Data Sources

windowsRegistry Set Events

Platforms

windows

Tags

attack.privilege-escalationattack.persistenceattack.defense-evasionattack.t1547.001attack.t1112
Raw Content
title: Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
id: ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
references:
    - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1562.002#atomic-test-8---modify-event-log-channel-access-permissions-via-registry---powershell
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSYvHUVU8xY
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-definition-language
author: X__Junior
date: 2025-01-16
modified: 2025-08-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    # O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)
    # O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x2;;;S-1-15-2-1)(D;;0x1;;;WD)
    selection_key_1:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CustomSD'
    selection_key_2:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\ChannelAccess'
    selection_details:
        - Details|contains: 'D:(D;'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - 'D:('
              - ')(D;'
    filter_main_trustedinstaller:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe'
    filter_main_tiworker:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
        Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
    filter_optional_empty:
        Image: ''
    filter_optional_null:
        Image: null
    condition: 1 of selection_key_* and selection_details and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity, still unlikely
level: high