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Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
Detection Query
selection_key_1:
TargetObject|contains: \SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\
TargetObject|endswith: \CustomSD
selection_key_2:
TargetObject|contains:
- \Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\
- \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels
TargetObject|endswith: \ChannelAccess
selection_details:
- Details|contains: D:(D;
- Details|contains|all:
- D:(
- )(D;
filter_main_trustedinstaller:
Image: C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
filter_main_tiworker:
Image|startswith: C:\Windows\WinSxS\
Image|endswith: \TiWorker.exe
filter_optional_empty:
Image: ""
filter_optional_null:
Image: null
condition: 1 of selection_key_* and selection_details and not 1 of filter_main_*
and not 1 of filter_optional_*
Author
X__Junior
Created
2025-01-16
Data Sources
windowsRegistry Set Events
Platforms
windows
References
Tags
attack.privilege-escalationattack.persistenceattack.defense-evasionattack.t1547.001attack.t1112
Raw Content
title: Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
id: ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156
status: experimental
description: |
Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
references:
- https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1562.002#atomic-test-8---modify-event-log-channel-access-permissions-via-registry---powershell
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSYvHUVU8xY
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-definition-language
author: X__Junior
date: 2025-01-16
modified: 2025-08-16
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.t1112
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
# O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)
# O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x2;;;S-1-15-2-1)(D;;0x1;;;WD)
selection_key_1:
TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\'
TargetObject|endswith: '\CustomSD'
selection_key_2:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\'
- '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels'
TargetObject|endswith: '\ChannelAccess'
selection_details:
- Details|contains: 'D:(D;'
- Details|contains|all:
- 'D:('
- ')(D;'
filter_main_trustedinstaller:
Image: 'C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe'
filter_main_tiworker:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
filter_optional_empty:
Image: ''
filter_optional_null:
Image: null
condition: 1 of selection_key_* and selection_details and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative activity, still unlikely
level: high