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splunk_escuTTP
O365 Service Principal Privilege Escalation
This detection identifies when an Azure Service Principal elevates privileges by adding themself to a new app role assignment.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
`o365_management_activity` Operation="Add app role assignment to service principal." "Actor{}.ID"=ServicePrincipal ResultStatus=Success | spath path=ModifiedProperties{} output=targetResources | eval src="NA" | stats min(_time) as _time values(eval(mvfilter(match(targetResources, "AppRole.Value")))) as appRole, values(eval(mvfilter(match(targetResources, "ServicePrincipal.DisplayName")))) as targetServicePrincipal values(object) as targetAppContext values(user_agent) as user_agent values(user) as servicePrincipal values(UserId) as servicePrincipalId by Operation InterSystemsId tenant_id user dest src vendor_account vendor_product signature | spath input=appRole path=NewValue output=appRole | spath input=targetServicePrincipal path=NewValue output=targetServicePrincipal | where servicePrincipal=targetServicePrincipal | fillnull | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by servicePrincipal servicePrincipalId appRole targetAppContext user_agent tenant_id InterSystemsId user dest src vendor_account vendor_product signature | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_service_principal_privilege_escalation_filter`Author
Dean Luxton
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
O365 Add app role assignment grant to user.
References
Tags
Azure Active Directory Privilege EscalationOffice 365 Account Takeover
Raw Content
name: O365 Service Principal Privilege Escalation
id: b686d0bd-cca7-44ca-ae07-87f6465131d9
version: 7
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Dean Luxton
data_source:
- O365 Add app role assignment grant to user.
type: TTP
status: production
description: This detection identifies when an Azure Service Principal elevates privileges by adding themself to a new app role assignment.
search: >-
`o365_management_activity` Operation="Add app role assignment to service principal." "Actor{}.ID"=ServicePrincipal ResultStatus=Success
| spath path=ModifiedProperties{} output=targetResources
| eval src="NA"
| stats min(_time) as _time values(eval(mvfilter(match(targetResources, "AppRole.Value")))) as appRole, values(eval(mvfilter(match(targetResources, "ServicePrincipal.DisplayName")))) as targetServicePrincipal values(object) as targetAppContext values(user_agent) as user_agent values(user) as servicePrincipal values(UserId) as servicePrincipalId by Operation InterSystemsId tenant_id user dest src vendor_account vendor_product signature
| spath input=appRole path=NewValue output=appRole
| spath input=targetServicePrincipal path=NewValue output=targetServicePrincipal
| where servicePrincipal=targetServicePrincipal
| fillnull
| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by servicePrincipal servicePrincipalId appRole targetAppContext user_agent tenant_id InterSystemsId user dest src vendor_account vendor_product signature
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `o365_service_principal_privilege_escalation_filter`
how_to_implement: The Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Office 365 add-on is required to ingest EntraID audit logs via the 365 API. See references for links for further details on how to onboard this log source.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4055
- https://github.com/mvelazc0/BadZure
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-m365-invaders-navigating-the-shadows-of-midnight-blizzard.html
- https://posts.specterops.io/microsoft-breach-what-happened-what-should-azure-admins-do-da2b7e674ebc
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$servicePrincipal$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search servicePrincipal = "$servicePrincipal$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$servicePrincipal$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$servicePrincipal$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: Service Principal $servicePrincipal$ has elevated privileges by adding themself to app role $appRole$
risk_objects:
- field: servicePrincipal
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: user_agent
type: http_user_agent
tags:
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- Office 365 Account Takeover
asset_type: Azure Tenant
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: identity
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.003/o365_spn_privesc/o365_spn_privesc.log
sourcetype: o365:management:activity
source: Office 365