splunk_escuTTP

Detect New Local Admin account

The following analytic detects the creation of new accounts elevated to local administrators. It uses Windows event logs, specifically EventCode 4720 (user account creation) and EventCode 4732 (user added to Administrators group). This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized privilege escalation, which is critical for SOC monitoring. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain administrative access, leading to unauthorized data access, system modifications, and disruption of services. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate risks and prevent further unauthorized actions.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1136.001

Detection Query

`wineventlog_security`
(
  EventCode=4720
  OR
  (
    EventCode=4732
    AND
    (
      Group_Name=Administrators
      OR
      TargetUserName=Administrators
    )
  )
)
| transaction user dest connected=false maxspan=180m
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
              dc(EventCode) as distinct_eventcodes
  by src_user user dest
| where distinct_eventcodes > 1
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`

Author

David Dorsey, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Windows Event Log Security 4732Windows Event Log Security 4720

Tags

DHS Report TA18-074AHAFNIUM GroupCISA AA22-257ACISA AA24-241AScattered Lapsus$ Hunters

Raw Content

name: Detect New Local Admin account
id: b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d
version: 11
date: '2026-03-10'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of new accounts elevated to local administrators. It uses Windows event logs, specifically EventCode 4720 (user account creation) and EventCode 4732 (user added to Administrators group). This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized privilege escalation, which is critical for SOC monitoring. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain administrative access, leading to unauthorized data access, system modifications, and disruption of services. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate risks and prevent further unauthorized actions.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4732
    - Windows Event Log Security 4720
search: |
    `wineventlog_security`
    (
      EventCode=4720
      OR
      (
        EventCode=4732
        AND
        (
          Group_Name=Administrators
          OR
          TargetUserName=Administrators
        )
      )
    )
    | transaction user dest connected=false maxspan=180m
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
                  dc(EventCode) as distinct_eventcodes
      by src_user user dest
    | where distinct_eventcodes > 1
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`
how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732
known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives
references: []
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.
    risk_objects:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - DHS Report TA18-074A
        - HAFNIUM Group
        - CISA AA22-257A
        - CISA AA24-241A
        - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
    asset_type: Windows
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1136.001
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: access
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
          source: WinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: WinEventLog
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log
          source: WinEventLog:System
          sourcetype: WinEventLog
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog