← Back to Explore
splunk_escuAnomaly
ICACLS Grant Command
The following analytic detects the use of the ICACLS command to grant additional access permissions to files or directories. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to manipulate file permissions, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process_name IN ( "icacls.exe", "cacls.exe", "xcacls.exe") AND
Processes.process IN ("*/grant*", "*/g:*", "*/g *")
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `icacls_grant_command_filter`
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
Tags
RansomwareCrypto StealerXMRigDefense Evasion or Unauthorized Access Via SDDL TamperingNetSupport RMM Tool Abuse
Raw Content
name: ICACLS Grant Command
id: b1b1e316-accc-11eb-a9b4-acde48001122
version: 12
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
The following analytic detects the use of the ICACLS command to grant
additional access permissions to files or directories. It leverages data from Endpoint
Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process names and command-line
arguments. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by Advanced
Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and maintain
control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow
attackers to manipulate file permissions, potentially leading to unauthorized access,
data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process_name IN ( "icacls.exe", "cacls.exe", "xcacls.exe") AND
Processes.process IN ("*/grant*", "*/g:*", "*/g *")
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `icacls_grant_command_filter`
how_to_implement: |
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Ransomware
- Crypto Stealer
- XMRig
- Defense Evasion or Unauthorized Access Via SDDL Tampering
- NetSupport RMM Tool Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1222
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog