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AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account
Detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.
Detection Query
selection:
eventSource: route53.amazonaws.com
eventName: TransferDomainToAnotherAwsAccount
condition: selection
Author
Elastic, Austin Songer @austinsonger
Created
2021-07-22
Data Sources
awscloudtrail
Platforms
aws
Tags
attack.persistenceattack.credential-accessattack.privilege-escalationattack.t1098
Raw Content
title: AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account
id: b056de1a-6e6e-4e40-a67e-97c9808cf41b
status: test
description: Detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.
references:
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.toml
author: Elastic, Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-07-22
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: route53.amazonaws.com
eventName: TransferDomainToAnotherAwsAccount
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A domain may be transferred to another AWS account by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Domain transfers from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: low