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Windows AD DCShadow Privileges ACL Addition
This detection identifies an Active Directory access-control list (ACL) modification event, which applies the minimum required extended rights to perform the DCShadow attack.
Detection Query
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 ObjectClass=domainDNS
| stats min(_time) as _time values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14675",AttributeValue,null))) as old_value values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14674",AttributeValue,null))) as new_value values(OperationType) as OperationType values(dest) as dest
BY ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID
src_user SubjectLogonId
| rex field=old_value max_match=10000 "\((?P<old_values>.*?)\)"
| rex field=new_value max_match=10000 "\((?P<new_ace>.*?)\)"
| mvexpand new_ace
| where NOT new_ace IN (old_values)
| rex field=new_ace "(?P<aceType>.*?);(?P<aceFlags>.*?);(?P<aceAccessRights>.*?);(?P<aceObjectGuid>.*?);;(?P<aceSid>.*?)$"
| search aceObjectGuid IN ("9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2","1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2","1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2")
| rex max_match=100 field=aceAccessRights "(?P<AccessRights>[A-Z]{2})"
| rex max_match=100 field=aceFlags "(?P<aceFlags>[A-Z]{2})"
| lookup msad_guid_lookup guid as aceObjectGuid OUTPUT displayName as ControlAccessRights
| lookup ace_access_rights_lookup access_rights_string as AccessRights OUTPUT access_rights_value
| lookup ace_type_lookup ace_type_string as aceType OUTPUT ace_type_value
| lookup ace_flag_lookup flag_string as aceFlags OUTPUT flag_value as ace_flag_value ``` Optional SID resolution lookups
| lookup identity_lookup_expanded objectSid as aceSid OUTPUT downLevelDomainName as user
| lookup admon_groups_def objectSid as aceSid OUTPUT cn as group ```
| lookup builtin_groups_lookup builtin_group_string as aceSid OUTPUT builtin_group_name as builtin_group
| eval aceType=coalesce(ace_type_value,aceType), aceFlags=coalesce(ace_flag_value,"This object only"), aceAccessRights=if(aceAccessRights="CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO","Full control",coalesce(access_rights_value,AccessRights)), aceControlAccessRights=coalesce(ControlAccessRights,aceObjectGuid), user=coalesce(user, group, builtin_group, aceSid)
| stats min(_time) as _time values(aceType) as aceType values(aceFlags) as aceFlags(inheritance) values(aceControlAccessRights) as aceControlAccessRights values(aceAccessRights) as aceAccessRights values(new_ace) as new_ace values(SubjectLogonId) as SubjectLogonId
BY ObjectClass ObjectDN src_user
user
| search (aceControlAccessRights="Add/Remove Replica In Domain" AND aceControlAccessRights="Manage Replication Topology" AND aceControlAccessRights="Replication Synchronization") OR (aceControlAccessRights="9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2" AND aceControlAccessRights="1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2" AND aceControlAccessRights="1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2")
| `windows_ad_dcshadow_privileges_acl_addition_filter`Author
Dean Luxton
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Windows Event Log Security 5136
References
- https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/04/dcshadow.html
- https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/ActiveDirectory/Set-DCShadowPermissions.ps1
- https://trustedsec.com/blog/a-hitchhackers-guide-to-dacl-based-detections-part-1-a
- https://lantern.splunk.com/Security/Product_Tips/Enterprise_Security/Enabling_an_audit_trail_from_Active_Directory
Tags
Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
Raw Content
name: Windows AD DCShadow Privileges ACL Addition
id: ae915743-1aa8-4a94-975c-8062ebc8b723
version: 9
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Dean Luxton
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 5136
description: This detection identifies an Active Directory access-control list (ACL) modification event, which applies the minimum required extended rights to perform the DCShadow attack.
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 ObjectClass=domainDNS
| stats min(_time) as _time values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14675",AttributeValue,null))) as old_value values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14674",AttributeValue,null))) as new_value values(OperationType) as OperationType values(dest) as dest
BY ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID
src_user SubjectLogonId
| rex field=old_value max_match=10000 "\((?P<old_values>.*?)\)"
| rex field=new_value max_match=10000 "\((?P<new_ace>.*?)\)"
| mvexpand new_ace
| where NOT new_ace IN (old_values)
| rex field=new_ace "(?P<aceType>.*?);(?P<aceFlags>.*?);(?P<aceAccessRights>.*?);(?P<aceObjectGuid>.*?);;(?P<aceSid>.*?)$"
| search aceObjectGuid IN ("9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2","1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2","1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2")
| rex max_match=100 field=aceAccessRights "(?P<AccessRights>[A-Z]{2})"
| rex max_match=100 field=aceFlags "(?P<aceFlags>[A-Z]{2})"
| lookup msad_guid_lookup guid as aceObjectGuid OUTPUT displayName as ControlAccessRights
| lookup ace_access_rights_lookup access_rights_string as AccessRights OUTPUT access_rights_value
| lookup ace_type_lookup ace_type_string as aceType OUTPUT ace_type_value
| lookup ace_flag_lookup flag_string as aceFlags OUTPUT flag_value as ace_flag_value ``` Optional SID resolution lookups
| lookup identity_lookup_expanded objectSid as aceSid OUTPUT downLevelDomainName as user
| lookup admon_groups_def objectSid as aceSid OUTPUT cn as group ```
| lookup builtin_groups_lookup builtin_group_string as aceSid OUTPUT builtin_group_name as builtin_group
| eval aceType=coalesce(ace_type_value,aceType), aceFlags=coalesce(ace_flag_value,"This object only"), aceAccessRights=if(aceAccessRights="CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO","Full control",coalesce(access_rights_value,AccessRights)), aceControlAccessRights=coalesce(ControlAccessRights,aceObjectGuid), user=coalesce(user, group, builtin_group, aceSid)
| stats min(_time) as _time values(aceType) as aceType values(aceFlags) as aceFlags(inheritance) values(aceControlAccessRights) as aceControlAccessRights values(aceAccessRights) as aceAccessRights values(new_ace) as new_ace values(SubjectLogonId) as SubjectLogonId
BY ObjectClass ObjectDN src_user
user
| search (aceControlAccessRights="Add/Remove Replica In Domain" AND aceControlAccessRights="Manage Replication Topology" AND aceControlAccessRights="Replication Synchronization") OR (aceControlAccessRights="9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2" AND aceControlAccessRights="1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2" AND aceControlAccessRights="1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2")
| `windows_ad_dcshadow_privileges_acl_addition_filter`
how_to_implement: Ensure you are ingesting Active Directory audit logs - specifically event 5136. See lantern article in references for further on how to onboard AD audit data. Ensure the wineventlog_security macro is configured with the correct indexes and include lookups for SID resolution if evt_resolve_ad_obj is set to 0.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/04/dcshadow.html
- https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/ActiveDirectory/Set-DCShadowPermissions.ps1
- https://trustedsec.com/blog/a-hitchhackers-guide-to-dacl-based-detections-part-1-a
- https://lantern.splunk.com/Security/Product_Tips/Enterprise_Security/Enabling_an_audit_trail_from_Active_Directory
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$src_user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" src_user = "$src_user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$src_user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$src_user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: ACL modification Event Initiated by $src_user$ applying $user$ the minimum required extended rights to perform a DCShadow attack.
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
- field: src_user
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1484
- T1207
- T1222.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484/DCShadowPermissions/windows-security-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog