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ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN
The following analytic detects the use of `setspn.exe` to query the domain for Service Principal Names (SPNs). This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on specific command-line arguments associated with `setspn.exe`. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it often precedes Kerberoasting or Silver Ticket attacks, which can lead to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the gathered SPNs to escalate privileges or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE `process_setspn` (Processes.process="*-t*"
AND
Processes.process="*-f*")
OR
(Processes.process="*-q*"
AND
Processes.process="**/**")
OR
(Processes.process="*-q*")
OR
(Processes.process="*-s*")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
References
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220212163642/https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
- https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
- https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
Tags
Active Directory DiscoveryActive Directory Privilege EscalationCompromised Windows HostActive Directory Kerberos Attacks
Raw Content
name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN
id: ae8b3efc-2d2e-11ec-8b57-acde48001122
version: 11
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of `setspn.exe` to query the domain for Service Principal Names (SPNs). This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on specific command-line arguments associated with `setspn.exe`. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it often precedes Kerberoasting or Silver Ticket attacks, which can lead to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the gathered SPNs to escalate privileges or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE `process_setspn` (Processes.process="*-t*"
AND
Processes.process="*-f*")
OR
(Processes.process="*-q*"
AND
Processes.process="**/**")
OR
(Processes.process="*-q*")
OR
(Processes.process="*-s*")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220212163642/https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
- https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
- https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principal names.
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process_name
type: process_name
tags:
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Discovery
- Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- Compromised Windows Host
- Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1558.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog