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sublimemediumRule
Brand impersonation: SharePoint PDF attachment with credential theft language
PDF attachment contains SharePoint logo and high-confidence credential theft language detected via OCR analysis. The attachment includes URLs and originates from an unsolicited or low-reputation sender, excluding legitimate SharePoint file sharing notifications.
Detection Query
type.inbound
and (
any(attachments,
(
.file_type == "pdf"
and any(ml.logo_detect(.).brands, .name == "Microsoft SharePoint")
and any(file.explode(.), length(.scan.url.urls) > 0)
and any(file.explode(.),
any(ml.nlu_classifier(.scan.ocr.raw).intents,
.name == "cred_theft" and .confidence == "high"
)
)
)
)
)
// negate sharepoint file share
and not (
// based on the message id format
(
(
strings.starts_with(headers.message_id, '<Share-')
and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, '@odspnotify>')
)
or // negate legitimate access request to file
(
strings.starts_with(headers.message_id, '<Sharing')
and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, '@odspnotify>')
)
// deal with Google thinking the message ID is "broke"
or (
strings.icontains(headers.message_id, 'SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN')
and any(headers.hops,
any(.fields,
.name == "X-Google-Original-Message-ID"
and strings.starts_with(.value, '<Share-')
and strings.ends_with(.value, '@odspnotify>')
)
)
)
)
// all of the "action" links are sharepoint/ms
and all(filter(body.links,
strings.icontains(subject.subject, .display_text)
or .display_text == "Open"
),
.href_url.domain.root_domain in ("sharepoint.com")
or (
.href_url.domain.tld == "ms"
// Microsoft does not own the .ms TLD, this checks to ensure it is one of their domains
and (
network.whois(.href_url.domain).registrant_company == "Microsoft Corporation"
or strings.ilike(network.whois(.href_url.domain).registrar_name,
"*MarkMonitor*",
"*CSC Corporate*",
"*com laude*"
)
)
)
)
)
and not (
(
(subject.is_reply or subject.is_forward)
and (
(length(headers.references) > 0 or headers.in_reply_to is not null)
// ensure that there are actual threads
and (
length(body.previous_threads) > 0
or (length(body.html.display_text) - length(body.current_thread.text)) > 200
)
)
)
)
and (
profile.by_sender_email().prevalence != 'common'
or not profile.by_sender_email().solicited
or profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
)
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Data Sources
Email MessagesEmail HeadersEmail Attachments
Platforms
email
Raw Content
name: "Brand impersonation: SharePoint PDF attachment with credential theft language"
description: "PDF attachment contains SharePoint logo and high-confidence credential theft language detected via OCR analysis. The attachment includes URLs and originates from an unsolicited or low-reputation sender, excluding legitimate SharePoint file sharing notifications."
type: "rule"
severity: "medium"
source: |
type.inbound
and (
any(attachments,
(
.file_type == "pdf"
and any(ml.logo_detect(.).brands, .name == "Microsoft SharePoint")
and any(file.explode(.), length(.scan.url.urls) > 0)
and any(file.explode(.),
any(ml.nlu_classifier(.scan.ocr.raw).intents,
.name == "cred_theft" and .confidence == "high"
)
)
)
)
)
// negate sharepoint file share
and not (
// based on the message id format
(
(
strings.starts_with(headers.message_id, '<Share-')
and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, '@odspnotify>')
)
or // negate legitimate access request to file
(
strings.starts_with(headers.message_id, '<Sharing')
and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, '@odspnotify>')
)
// deal with Google thinking the message ID is "broke"
or (
strings.icontains(headers.message_id, 'SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN')
and any(headers.hops,
any(.fields,
.name == "X-Google-Original-Message-ID"
and strings.starts_with(.value, '<Share-')
and strings.ends_with(.value, '@odspnotify>')
)
)
)
)
// all of the "action" links are sharepoint/ms
and all(filter(body.links,
strings.icontains(subject.subject, .display_text)
or .display_text == "Open"
),
.href_url.domain.root_domain in ("sharepoint.com")
or (
.href_url.domain.tld == "ms"
// Microsoft does not own the .ms TLD, this checks to ensure it is one of their domains
and (
network.whois(.href_url.domain).registrant_company == "Microsoft Corporation"
or strings.ilike(network.whois(.href_url.domain).registrar_name,
"*MarkMonitor*",
"*CSC Corporate*",
"*com laude*"
)
)
)
)
)
and not (
(
(subject.is_reply or subject.is_forward)
and (
(length(headers.references) > 0 or headers.in_reply_to is not null)
// ensure that there are actual threads
and (
length(body.previous_threads) > 0
or (length(body.html.display_text) - length(body.current_thread.text)) > 200
)
)
)
)
and (
profile.by_sender_email().prevalence != 'common'
or not profile.by_sender_email().solicited
or profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
)
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
attack_types:
- "Credential Phishing"
tactics_and_techniques:
- "Impersonation: Brand"
- "Social engineering"
- "PDF"
- "Evasion"
detection_methods:
- "Computer Vision"
- "File analysis"
- "Natural Language Understanding"
- "Optical Character Recognition"
- "Sender analysis"
- "URL analysis"
- "Header analysis"
- "Whois"
id: "ae3756fa-3751-5fba-b68d-d91164fd359c"