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WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon
The following analytic identifies the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions, which can be used to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. It leverages Sysmon data, specifically EventCodes 19, 20, and 21, to detect the creation of WMI EventFilters, EventConsumers, and FilterToConsumerBindings. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker setting up mechanisms to execute code with elevated SYSTEM privileges when specific events occur. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, and execute arbitrary code, posing a severe threat to the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
`sysmon` EventCode=21
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest dvc object
object_attrs object_category object_path
signature signature_id src
status user user_id
vendor_product Consumer ConsumerNoQuotes
Filter FilterNoQuotes
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`Author
Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 21
References
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md
- https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/
- https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/chapters/WMI-events.md
- https://in.security/2019/04/03/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/
Tags
Suspicious WMI Use
Raw Content
name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon
id: ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9
version: 10
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions, which can be used to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. It leverages Sysmon data, specifically EventCodes 19, 20, and 21, to detect the creation of WMI EventFilters, EventConsumers, and FilterToConsumerBindings. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker setting up mechanisms to execute code with elevated SYSTEM privileges when specific events occur. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, and execute arbitrary code, posing a severe threat to the environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 21
search: |-
`sysmon` EventCode=21
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest dvc object
object_attrs object_category object_path
signature signature_id src
status user user_id
vendor_product Consumer ConsumerNoQuotes
Filter FilterNoQuotes
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md
- https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/
- https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/chapters/WMI-events.md
- https://in.security/2019/04/03/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: WMI Permanent Event Subscription detected on $dest$ by $user$
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious WMI Use
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1546.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog