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splunk_escuAnomaly

Windows Execution of Microsoft MSC File In Suspicious Path

The following analytic detects when a Microsoft Management Console (MMC) process executes an .msc file in a suspicious path on a Windows system. While .msc files are legitimate components used for system administration, unexpected execution of these files by non-administrative processes or in unusual contexts can indicate malicious activity, such as living-off-the-land attacks, persistence mechanisms, or automated administrative abuse. This detection monitors process creation events, command-line arguments, and parent process relationships to help distinguish normal administrative usage from potential threats. Alerts should be investigated in the context of the process initiating the .msc file, the target system, and any subsequent network or system activity, as routine administrative tasks may also trigger this behavior.

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection Query

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where (Processes.process_name=mmc.exe)
AND Processes.process = "*.msc*"
AND Processes.process IN (
  "*\\PerfLogs\\*",
  "*\\programdata\\*"
  "*Recycle.bin*",
  "*\\Download*",
  "*\\temp\\*",
  "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
  "*\\Users\\Default\\*",
  "*\\Users\\Public\\*",
  "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\INF\\*"
  "*:\\Windows\\debug\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\fonts\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\Media\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\repair\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\servicing\\*",
  )
AND NOT (Processes.process IN ("*C:\\Windows\\System32\\eventvwr.msc*", "*C:\\Windows\\System32\\certmgr.msc*"))

by Processes.action
Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_execution_of_microsoft_msc_file_in_suspicious_path_filter`

Author

Teoderick Contreras, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2

Tags

XML Runner Loader
Raw Content
name: Windows Execution of Microsoft MSC File In Suspicious Path
id: ac30858b-7c25-4f0a-a7fa-bef036e49dc3
version: 3
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects when a Microsoft Management Console (MMC) process executes an .msc file in a suspicious path on a Windows system. While .msc files are legitimate components used for system administration, unexpected execution of these files by non-administrative processes or in unusual contexts can indicate malicious activity, such as living-off-the-land attacks, persistence mechanisms, or automated administrative abuse. This detection monitors process creation events, command-line arguments, and parent process relationships to help distinguish normal administrative usage from potential threats. Alerts should be investigated in the context of the process initiating the .msc file, the target system, and any subsequent network or system activity, as routine administrative tasks may also trigger this behavior.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
    as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name=mmc.exe)
    AND Processes.process = "*.msc*"
    AND Processes.process IN (
      "*\\PerfLogs\\*",
      "*\\programdata\\*"
      "*Recycle.bin*",
      "*\\Download*",
      "*\\temp\\*",
      "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
      "*\\Users\\Default\\*",
      "*\\Users\\Public\\*",
      "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\INF\\*"
      "*:\\Windows\\debug\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\fonts\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\Media\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\repair\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\servicing\\*",
      )
    AND NOT (Processes.process IN ("*C:\\Windows\\System32\\eventvwr.msc*", "*C:\\Windows\\System32\\certmgr.msc*"))

    by Processes.action
    Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
    Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
    Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
    Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
    Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_execution_of_microsoft_msc_file_in_suspicious_path_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: A possible false positive (FP) for the execution of .msc files is legitimate administrative activity, since .msc files are standard Microsoft Management Console snap-ins used for system administration.
references:
    - https://www.securonix.com/blog/analyzing-fluxconsole-using-tax-themed-lures-threat-actors-exploit-windows-management-console-to-deliver-backdoor-payloads/
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A Microsoft Management Console process [ $process_name$ ] launched an .msc file [ $process$ ] on the target system [ $dest$ ].
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
    threat_objects:
        - field: parent_process_name
          type: parent_process_name
        - field: process_name
          type: process_name
        - field: process
          type: process
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - XML Runner Loader
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1218.014
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.014/msc_execution/loaded_msc_mmc.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog