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elasticmediumTTP
GKE Privileged Pod Created
Detects successful GKE audit events where a pod is created with allowPrivilegeEscalation enabled. This weakens container isolation and can help an attacker escalate toward host access. Standalone pods are included; workloads owned by ReplicaSet, DaemonSet, or StatefulSet controllers are excluded.
Detection Query
data_stream.dataset:gcp.audit and event.action:"io.k8s.core.v1.pods.create" and event.outcome:success and
gcp.audit.request.spec.containers.securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation:true and
not gcp.audit.request.metadata.ownerReferences.kind:("ReplicaSet" or "DaemonSet" or "StatefulSet")
Author
Elastic
Created
2026/06/30
Data Sources
GCPGoogle Cloud Platformlogs-gcp.audit-*
References
Tags
Domain: CloudDomain: KubernetesData Source: GCPData Source: Google Cloud PlatformUse Case: Threat DetectionTactic: Privilege EscalationTactic: ExecutionResources: Investigation Guide
Raw Content
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/06/30"
integration = ["gcp"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/06/30"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects successful GKE audit events where a pod is created with allowPrivilegeEscalation enabled. This weakens
container isolation and can help an attacker escalate toward host access. Standalone pods are included; workloads owned
by ReplicaSet, DaemonSet, or StatefulSet controllers are excluded.
"""
false_positives = [
"""
Debug or break-glass pods may enable privilege escalation intentionally. Exclude trusted namespaces, users, or
deployment patterns after baselining.
""",
]
index = ["logs-gcp.audit-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "GKE Privileged Pod Created"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating GKE Privileged Pod Created
Review `user.email`, `orchestrator.resource.name`, `orchestrator.namespace`, and the pod spec in `gcp.audit.request`.
Confirm whether allowPrivilegeEscalation is required for the workload.
### Investigation steps
- Identify the actor and source (`user.email`, `source.ip`, `user_agent.original`).
- Inspect container images and securityContext in the audit request payload.
- Correlate with RBAC changes, secret access, or exec activity from the same identity.
### False positives
- One-off admin debugging pods; tune by user or namespace when documented.
## Setup
The GCP Fleet integration with GKE audit logs enabled is required to be compatible with this rule."""
references = [
"https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging",
"https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "a7b984e4-16ff-405b-80be-31a94a03e929"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Cloud",
"Domain: Kubernetes",
"Data Source: GCP",
"Data Source: Google Cloud Platform",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
"Tactic: Execution",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
query = '''
data_stream.dataset:gcp.audit and event.action:"io.k8s.core.v1.pods.create" and event.outcome:success and
gcp.audit.request.spec.containers.securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation:true and
not gcp.audit.request.metadata.ownerReferences.kind:("ReplicaSet" or "DaemonSet" or "StatefulSet")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1611"
name = "Escape to Host"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1610"
name = "Deploy Container"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"