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splunk_escuAnomaly

System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations

The following analytic identifies system processes running from unexpected locations outside of paths such as `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process paths, names, and hashes. This activity is significant as it may indicate a malicious process attempting to masquerade as a legitimate system process. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.

MITRE ATT&CK

defense-evasion

Detection Query

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
  NOT Processes.process_path IN (
    "*:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\*",
    "*:\\$WinREAgent\\*",
    "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Windows Kits\\10\\App Certification Kit\\*",
    "*:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\*",
    "*:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
    "*:\\Windows\\SystemTemp\\*",
    "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*",
    "*:\\Windows\\uus\\*",
    "*:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*"
  )
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
   Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
   Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile
| search systemFile=true
| `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`

Author

David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2

Tags

Suspicious Command-Line ExecutionsUnusual ProcessesRansomwareMasquerading - Rename System UtilitiesQakbotWindows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilityDarkGate Malware
Raw Content
name: System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations
id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d
version: 15
date: '2026-03-10'
author: David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies system processes running from unexpected locations outside of paths such as `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process paths, names, and hashes. This activity is significant as it may indicate a malicious process attempting to masquerade as a legitimate system process. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
      FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
      NOT Processes.process_path IN (
        "*:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\*",
        "*:\\$WinREAgent\\*",
        "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Windows Kits\\10\\App Certification Kit\\*",
        "*:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\*",
        "*:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
        "*:\\Windows\\SystemTemp\\*",
        "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*",
        "*:\\Windows\\uus\\*",
        "*:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*"
      )
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
       Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
       Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
       Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile
    | search systemFile=true
    | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A System process $process_name$ is running from $process_path$ on $dest$, potentially non-standard.
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
    threat_objects:
        - field: process_name
          type: process_name
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
        - Unusual Processes
        - Ransomware
        - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
        - Qakbot
        - Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
        - DarkGate Malware
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1036.003
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog