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splunk_escuAnomaly
Remote System Discovery with Dsquery
The following analytic detects the execution of `dsquery.exe` with the `computer` argument, which is used to discover remote systems within a domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Remote system discovery is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance activities by adversaries or Red Teams to map out network resources and Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further exploitation, lateral movement, and unauthorized access to critical systems within the network.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
Processes.process_name="dsquery.exe"
)
(Processes.process="*computer*")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`Author
Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
References
Tags
Active Directory DiscoveryLAMEHUG
Raw Content
name: Remote System Discovery with Dsquery
id: 9fb562f4-42f8-4139-8e11-a82edf7ed718
version: 9
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the execution of `dsquery.exe` with the `computer` argument, which is used to discover remote systems within a domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Remote system discovery is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance activities by adversaries or Red Teams to map out network resources and Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further exploitation, lateral movement, and unauthorized access to critical systems within the network.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
Processes.process_name="dsquery.exe"
)
(Processes.process="*computer*")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process_name
type: process_name
tags:
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Discovery
- LAMEHUG
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1018
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog