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Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Name
The following analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks with known suspicious or malicious task names. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, modified, or enabled. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
Detection Query
`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702)
| eval TaskContent = case(isnotnull(TaskContentNew),TaskContentNew,true(),TaskContent)
| xmlkv TaskContent
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Arguments) as Arguments latest(Author) as Author by Computer, TaskName, Command, Enabled, Hidden,Caller_User_Name, EventCode
| lookup windows_suspicious_tasks task_name as TaskName
| where isnotnull(tool_type)
| eval command=TaskName, process=Command+if(isnotnull(Arguments)," ".Arguments,""), src_user=Author, user = Caller_User_Name, dest = Computer
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_name_filter`Author
Steven Dick
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Windows Event Log Security 4698Windows Event Log Security 4700Windows Event Log Security 4702
References
Tags
Scheduled TasksWindows Persistence TechniquesRansomwareRyuk Ransomware0bj3ctivity StealerAPT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealerCastle RAT
Raw Content
name: Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Name
id: 9e9ab4e3-c9d0-4967-a197-6d755e8a7e6e
version: 7
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks with known suspicious or malicious task names. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, modified, or enabled. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4698
- Windows Event Log Security 4700
- Windows Event Log Security 4702
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702)
| eval TaskContent = case(isnotnull(TaskContentNew),TaskContentNew,true(),TaskContent)
| xmlkv TaskContent
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Arguments) as Arguments latest(Author) as Author by Computer, TaskName, Command, Enabled, Hidden,Caller_User_Name, EventCode
| lookup windows_suspicious_tasks task_name as TaskName
| where isnotnull(tool_type)
| eval command=TaskName, process=Command+if(isnotnull(Arguments)," ".Arguments,""), src_user=Author, user = Caller_User_Name, dest = Computer
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_name_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
known_false_positives: False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
- https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2023/231213.pdf
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/11/06/bengal-cat-lovers-in-australia-get-psspsspssd-in-google-driven-gootloader-campaign/
- https://github.com/mthcht/awesome-lists/blob/main/Lists/suspicious_windows_tasks_list.csv
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$","$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: Investigate schedule tasks on $dest$
search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702) | xmlkv TaskContent | search dest="$dest$" AND TaskName = "$TaskName$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: A windows scheduled task was created with known suspicious task name [$TaskName$] on $dest$, this may be a [$tool$] indicator
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: Command
type: signature
tags:
analytic_story:
- Scheduled Tasks
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Ransomware
- Ryuk Ransomware
- 0bj3ctivity Stealer
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
- Castle RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1053.005
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/winevent_scheduled_task_with_suspect_name/windows-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog