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splunk_escuHunting
Windows System File on Disk
The following analytic detects the creation of new .sys files on disk. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify and log instances where .sys files are written to the filesystem. This activity is significant because .sys files are often used as kernel mode drivers, and their unauthorized creation can indicate malicious activity such as rootkit installation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain kernel-level access, leading to full system compromise, persistent control, and the ability to bypass security mechanisms.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
WHERE Filesystem.file_name="*.sys*"
BY Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time
Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time
Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl
Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id
Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_system_file_on_disk_filter`Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Created
2026-02-25
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 11
Tags
CISA AA22-264AWindows DriversCrypto Stealer
Raw Content
name: Windows System File on Disk
id: 993ce99d-9cdd-42c7-a2cf-733d5954e5a6
version: 8
date: '2026-02-25'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects the creation of new .sys files on disk. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify and log instances where .sys files are written to the filesystem. This activity is significant because .sys files are often used as kernel mode drivers, and their unauthorized creation can indicate malicious activity such as rootkit installation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain kernel-level access, leading to full system compromise, persistent control, and the ability to bypass security mechanisms.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 11
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
WHERE Filesystem.file_name="*.sys*"
BY Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time
Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time
Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl
Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id
Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_system_file_on_disk_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on files from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. In addition, filtering may occur by adding NOT (Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\Windows\\*", "*\\Program File*", "*\\systemroot\\*","%SystemRoot%*", "system32\*")). This will level out the noise generated to potentally lead to generating findings.
known_false_positives: False positives will be present. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/
tags:
analytic_story:
- CISA AA22-264A
- Windows Drivers
- Crypto Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1068
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/drivers/sysmon_sys_filemod.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog