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Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint
The following analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process details such as process name, parent process, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries often abuse Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise of the network.
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe
OR
Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe
)
(Processes.process= "* /S *" AND Processes.process=*/run*)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`Author
Mauricio Velazco, Splunk, Badoodish, Github Community
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
References
Tags
Living Off The LandActive Directory Lateral MovementScheduled TasksMedusa RansomwareSeashell Blizzard
Raw Content
name: Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint
id: 95cf4608-4302-11ec-8194-3e22fbd008af
version: 11
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk, Badoodish, Github Community
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process details such as process name, parent process, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries often abuse Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise of the network.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe
OR
Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe
)
(Processes.process= "* /S *" AND Processes.process=*/run*)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest$
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Living Off The Land
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
- Scheduled Tasks
- Medusa Ransomware
- Seashell Blizzard
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1053.005
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog