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Windows Suspicious C2 Named Pipe

The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious C2 named pipes. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by C2 tools. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.

Detection Query

`sysmon`
(EventCode=17 OR EventCode=18)
NOT process_path IN (
  "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*",
  "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*",
  "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*",
  "*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*",
  "*:\\Program Files\\Google*",
  "*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*",
  "*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
  "*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
  "*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*",
  "*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*",
  "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*",
  "*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*",
  "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*",
  "System"
)

| stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
count by dest dvc process_exec process_guid process_id process_path signature signature_id
vendor_product pipe_name user_id Image process_name

| lookup suspicious_c2_named_pipes suspicious_pipe_name AS pipe_name OUTPUT tool, description
| where isnotnull(tool)
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_suspicious_c2_named_pipe_filter`

Author

Raven Tait, Splunk

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 17Sysmon EventID 18
Raw Content
name: Windows Suspicious C2 Named Pipe
id: 90599d85-dc2a-4d4c-8c59-9485c3665828
version: 6
creation_date: '2025-12-08'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious C2 named pipes.
    It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by C2 tools.
    If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 17
    - Sysmon EventID 18
search: |
    `sysmon`
    (EventCode=17 OR EventCode=18)
    NOT process_path IN (
      "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*",
      "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*",
      "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*",
      "*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*",
      "*:\\Program Files\\Google*",
      "*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*",
      "*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
      "*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
      "*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*",
      "*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*",
      "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*",
      "*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*",
      "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*",
      "System"
    )

    | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    count by dest dvc process_exec process_guid process_id process_path signature signature_id
    vendor_product pipe_name user_id Image process_name

    | lookup suspicious_c2_named_pipes suspicious_pipe_name AS pipe_name OUTPUT tool, description
    | where isnotnull(tool)
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_suspicious_c2_named_pipe_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: |
    False positives should be rare, investigate matches and apply additional filters as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: An instance of $process_name$ located in $process_path$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ accessing known suspicious C2 named pipe $pipe_name$.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Storm-0501 Ransomware
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
    - BlackByte Ransomware
    - Brute Ratel C4
    - Cobalt Strike
    - DarkSide Ransomware
    - Gozi Malware
    - Graceful Wipe Out Attack
    - Hellcat Ransomware
    - LockBit Ransomware
    - Meterpreter
    - Remote Monitoring and Management Software
    - Trickbot
    - Tuoni
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1559
    - T1021.002
    - T1055
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit