splunk_escuTTP

Windows Kerberos Coercion via DNS

Detects DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication such as in CVE-2025-33073. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5136, 5137, 4662, looking for DNS events with specific CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION entries.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1071.004 T1557.001 T1187

command-and-control

Detection Query

`wineventlog_security`  (((EventCode="5136" OR EventCode="5137") ObjectClass="dnsNode" ObjectDN="*1UWhRCA*" ObjectDN="*AAAAA*" ObjectDN="*YBAAAA*") OR (EventCode="4662" AdditionalInfo="*1UWhRCA*" AdditionalInfo="*AAAAA*" AdditionalInfo="*YBAAAA*"))
  | eval Object=coalesce(lower(ObjectGUID), trim(AdditionalInfo2, "%{}"))
  | eval user=coalesce(SubjectUserName, Caller_User_Name)
  | stats min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode) as event_codes values(ObjectDN) as dns_record values(user) as user values(Computer) as dest
    BY Object
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
  | `windows_kerberos_coercion_via_dns_filter`

Author

Raven Tait, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Windows Event Log Security 4662Windows Event Log Security 5136Windows Event Log Security 5137

References

Tags

Compromised Windows HostSuspicious DNS TrafficLocal Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUpKerberos Coercion with DNS

Raw Content

name: Windows Kerberos Coercion via DNS
id: 9029b575-6f6b-4ab1-b660-67b24b7e9c3d
version: 3
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: Detects DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication such as in CVE-2025-33073. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5136, 5137, 4662, looking for DNS events with specific CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION entries.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4662
    - Windows Event Log Security 5136
    - Windows Event Log Security 5137
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security`  (((EventCode="5136" OR EventCode="5137") ObjectClass="dnsNode" ObjectDN="*1UWhRCA*" ObjectDN="*AAAAA*" ObjectDN="*YBAAAA*") OR (EventCode="4662" AdditionalInfo="*1UWhRCA*" AdditionalInfo="*AAAAA*" AdditionalInfo="*YBAAAA*"))
      | eval Object=coalesce(lower(ObjectGUID), trim(AdditionalInfo2, "%{}"))
      | eval user=coalesce(SubjectUserName, Caller_User_Name)
      | stats min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode) as event_codes values(ObjectDN) as dns_record values(user) as user values(Computer) as dest
        BY Object
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_kerberos_coercion_via_dns_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you ned to be ingesting Event codes `4662`, `5136`, `5137`. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Directory Services Changes` within `DS Access` needs to be enabled. For these event codes to be generated, specific SACLs are required.
known_false_positives: Creating a DNS entry matching this pattern is very unusual in a production environment. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20250617122747/https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/relaying-kerberos-over-smb-using-krbrelayx
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/the-birth-and-death-of-loopyticket/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  Computer = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A possible Kerberos coercion DNS object was created $dest$
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Compromised Windows Host
        - Suspicious DNS Traffic
        - Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp
        - Kerberos Coercion with DNS
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1071.004
        - T1557.001
        - T1187
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
    cve:
        - CVE-2025-33073
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1071.004/kerberos_coercion/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog