← Back to Explore
splunk_escuTTP
ETW Registry Disabled
The following analytic detects a registry modification that disables the ETW for the .NET Framework. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the ETWEnabled registry value under the .NETFramework path. This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools and hide their execution from audit logs. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to further compromise and persistent access within the environment.
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework*" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000) by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Steven Dick
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 13
References
Tags
Hermetic WiperWindows Persistence TechniquesWindows Privilege EscalationWindows Registry AbuseCISA AA23-347AData Destruction
Raw Content
name: ETW Registry Disabled
id: 8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122
version: 15
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a registry modification that disables the ETW for the .NET Framework. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the ETWEnabled registry value under the .NETFramework path. This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools and hide their execution from audit logs. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to further compromise and persistent access within the environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 13
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework*" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000) by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3
- https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-complus-etwenabled/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ on $dest$
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Hermetic Wiper
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Windows Privilege Escalation
- Windows Registry Abuse
- CISA AA23-347A
- Data Destruction
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1127
- T1562.006
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog