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splunk_escuTTP
Detect Exchange Web Shell
The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in known drop locations for Exchange exploitation, specifically targeting paths associated with HAFNIUM group and vulnerabilities like ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on process and filesystem events. This activity is significant as it may indicate a web shell deployment, a common method for persistent access and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges within the Exchange environment.
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\*", "*\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\*", "*\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\*") Filesystem.file_name IN( "*.aspx", "*.ashx") by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`Author
Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 11
References
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do
Tags
ProxyNotShellCISA AA22-257AHAFNIUM GroupProxyShellCompromised Windows HostBlackByte RansomwareSeashell BlizzardGhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
Raw Content
name: Detect Exchange Web Shell
id: 8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a
version: 14
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in known drop locations for Exchange exploitation, specifically targeting paths associated with HAFNIUM group and vulnerabilities like ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on process and filesystem events. This activity is significant as it may indicate a web shell deployment, a common method for persistent access and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges within the Exchange environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 11
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\*", "*\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\*", "*\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\*") Filesystem.file_name IN( "*.aspx", "*.ashx") by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.
known_false_positives: The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.
references:
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: file_name
type: file_name
tags:
analytic_story:
- ProxyNotShell
- CISA AA22-257A
- HAFNIUM Group
- ProxyShell
- Compromised Windows Host
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Seashell Blizzard
- GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1133
- T1190
- T1505.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog