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splunk_escuAnomaly

Linux Auditd Possible Access To Sudoers File

The following analytic detects potential access or modification of the /etc/sudoers file on a Linux system. It leverages data from Linux Auditd, focusing on events of type PATH or CWD. This activity could be significant because the sudoers file controls user permissions for executing commands with elevated privileges. Correlate this with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain persistence or escalate privileges, compromising the security of the targeted host.

MITRE ATT&CK

privilege-escalationdefense-evasion

Detection Query

`linux_auditd`
(type=PATH OR type=CWD)
| rex "msg=audit\([^)]*:(?<audit_id>\d+)\)"

| stats
  values(type) as types
  values(name) as names
  values(nametype) as nametype
  values(cwd) as cwd_list
  values(_time) as event_times
  by audit_id, host

| eval current_working_directory = coalesce(mvindex(cwd_list, 0), "N/A")
| eval candidate_paths = mvmap(names, if(match(names, "^/"), names, current_working_directory + "/" + names))
| eval matched_paths = mvfilter(match(candidate_paths, "/etc/sudoers.*"))
| eval match_count = mvcount(matched_paths)
| eval reconstructed_path = mvindex(matched_paths, 0)
| eval e_time = mvindex(event_times, 0)
| where match_count > 0
| rename host as dest

| stats count min(e_time) as firstTime max(e_time) as lastTime
  values(nametype) as nametype
  by current_working_directory
     reconstructed_path
     match_count
     dest
     audit_id

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_auditd_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter`

Author

Teoderick Contreras, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Linux Auditd PathLinux Auditd Cwd

Tags

Linux Persistence TechniquesCompromised Linux HostChina-Nexus Threat ActivitySalt TyphoonLinux Privilege Escalation
Raw Content
name: Linux Auditd Possible Access To Sudoers File
id: 8be88f46-f7e8-4ae6-b15e-cf1b13392834
version: 12
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    The following analytic detects potential access or modification of the /etc/sudoers file on a Linux system.
    It leverages data from Linux Auditd, focusing on events of type PATH or CWD.
    This activity could be significant because the sudoers file controls user permissions for executing commands with elevated privileges.
    Correlate this with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
    If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain persistence or escalate privileges, compromising the security of the targeted host.
data_source:
    - Linux Auditd Path
    - Linux Auditd Cwd
search: |
    `linux_auditd`
    (type=PATH OR type=CWD)
    | rex "msg=audit\([^)]*:(?<audit_id>\d+)\)"

    | stats
      values(type) as types
      values(name) as names
      values(nametype) as nametype
      values(cwd) as cwd_list
      values(_time) as event_times
      by audit_id, host

    | eval current_working_directory = coalesce(mvindex(cwd_list, 0), "N/A")
    | eval candidate_paths = mvmap(names, if(match(names, "^/"), names, current_working_directory + "/" + names))
    | eval matched_paths = mvfilter(match(candidate_paths, "/etc/sudoers.*"))
    | eval match_count = mvcount(matched_paths)
    | eval reconstructed_path = mvindex(matched_paths, 0)
    | eval e_time = mvindex(event_times, 0)
    | where match_count > 0
    | rename host as dest

    | stats count min(e_time) as firstTime max(e_time) as lastTime
      values(nametype) as nametype
      by current_working_directory
         reconstructed_path
         match_count
         dest
         audit_id

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `linux_auditd_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    To implement this detection, the process begins by ingesting auditd
    data, that consist SYSCALL, TYPE, EXECVE and PROCTITLE events, which captures command-line
    executions and process details on Unix/Linux systems. These logs should be ingested
    and processed using Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833),
    which is essential for correctly parsing and categorizing the data. The next step
    involves normalizing the field names  to match the field names set by the Splunk
    Common Information Model (CIM) to ensure consistency across different data sources
    and enhance the efficiency of data modeling and make sure the type=CWD record type is activate in your auditd configuration.
    This approach enables effective monitoring and detection of linux endpoints where auditd is deployed.
known_false_positives: |
    Administrator or network operator can execute this command.
    Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210708035426/https://www.cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual43.pdf
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: $reconstructed_path$ has been accessed for potential modification or deletion on host - [$dest$]
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Linux Persistence Techniques
        - Compromised Linux Host
        - China-Nexus Threat Activity
        - Salt Typhoon
        - Linux Privilege Escalation
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1548.003
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/auditd_path_sudoers/path_sudoers.log
          source: auditd
          sourcetype: auditd